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Abstract: The first vacancies on the Supreme Court in eleven years 
have sparked renewed debate about the continued viability of life tenure 
for federal judges. Scholars have decried life tenure as one of the 
Framers’ worst blunders, pointing to issues such as strategic retirement, 
longer average tenure, and widespread mental infirmity of Justices. In this 
Article, the authors argue that, notwithstanding the serious problem of 
mental and physical infirmity on the Court, life tenure should be retained. 
They also argue that recent statutory proposals to eliminate or undermine 
life tenure, for example through a mandatory retirement age or term 
limits, are unconstitutional.  
Surprisingly, scholars have failed to take a multidisciplinary approach 
to the question of life tenure, or to propose alternatives that address its 
weaknesses without abolishing it. The authors address that gap by 
adopting an incentives approach to Supreme Court retirement. They first 
demonstrate that, as an historical and empirical matter, pensions have 
been the most important factor in influencing the retirement timing of 
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Supreme Court Justices and comparable actors over history. Building on 
that track record, the authors propose that Congress create a “golden 
parachute” for Supreme Court Justices by doubling their retirement 
benefits upon reaching an appropriate retirement age or upon certifying a 
mental or physical disability. They also propose modest institutional 
reforms that will make the office of “Senior Justice” more attractive to 
Justices considering retirement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Life tenure is under attack yet again. In the popular press, the first 
vacancy on the Supreme Court in eleven years has triggered dozens of 
calls for judges to serve shorter, more predictable terms in office.1 In the 
legal academy too, a growing number of scholars decry life tenure as one 
of the Framers’ worst blunders.2 They support various replacement 
regimes, including term limits,3 direct elections,4 or a mandatory 
 1. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Fixed Terms for Supreme Court Justices, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, 
at C3; Michael Barone & Bruce Bartlett, Fusillades . . . And Tenure Traps, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 
2005, at A14; Barry Ellington, Letter to the Editor, Put Limits on Supreme Court Terms, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, July 10, 2005, at V4 (describing a “growing consensus toward a constitutional amendment 
to limit service of Supreme Court justices to single terms of [eighteen] years, staggered so that a new 
justice is appointed every second year”); Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Serve for Life, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at A19; Stuart Taylor Jr., Life Tenure Is Too Long for Supreme Court 
Justices, 2005 NAT’L J. 2033.  
 2. The recent scholarly movement has attracted attention even among nonlawyers. See Linda 
Greenhouse, How Long Is Too Long for the Court’s Justices?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 4, at 5; 
Tony Mauro, Op-Ed., Roots Grow Deeper on the Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2005, at 11A. 
 3. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 48–56 
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (endorsing eighteen-year staggered terms through 
constitutional amendment); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal 
Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR THE SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 471, supra; Sanford Levinson, Contempt of Court: The Most Important “Contemporary 
Challenge to Judging,” 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 341 (1992) (advocating single, nonrenewable 
terms of eighteen years); John O. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 
541–43 (1999) (proposing Supreme Court riding by lower court judges for a fixed term); Phillip D. 
Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered 
Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800–01 (1986) 
(endorsing eighteen-year staggered terms through constitutional amendment); Panel, Term Limits for 
Judges?, 13 J.L. & POL. 669, 687 (1997) (comment of Judge Laurence H. Silberman); L.A. Powe, Jr., 
Old People and Good Behavior, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 195, 197 (1995) (suggesting nonrenewable 
eighteen-year terms); Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 570–73 
(1999) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)) 
(recommending term limits); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable 
Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable 
Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2004) (recommending eighteen-year staggered 
terms through constitutional amendment); Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Editorial, Term 
Limits for the High Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A23 (supporting term limits for Justices); 
Gregg Easterbrook, Geritol Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17, 18–19 (proposing ten-year 
fixed terms through constitutional amendment).  
 4. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS 
(2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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retirement age,5 implemented by statute6 or constitutional amendment.7 
Even Chief Justice John Roberts argued in favor of term limits as a 
government lawyer.8 
Critics of life tenure score a few palpable hits. Mental and physical 
infirmity among federal judges is well documented and carries with it real 
costs for the quality of decisions and the credibility of the courts. 
Unfortunately, the critics dedicate most of their attention to the least 
significant problems. Some concerns are overblown, like the supposedly 
unprecedented increase in the average length of service for members of the 
Supreme Court. Others are more speculative, like the threat of strategic 
retirement. Recent scholarly literature that suggests circumventing life 
tenure by statute is especially alarming because it wraps unnecessary 
reforms into an unconstitutional package. 
Conspicuously absent from the popular and scholarly debate are viable 
options for addressing reformers’ concerns while still retaining life tenure. 
Although they sometimes acknowledge the availability of more restrained 
alternatives in passing,9 critics of life tenure focus their attention on 
proposals to abolish the system entirely. When they get into the details, 
they rarely agree on the contours of the brave new world they envision. As 
a result, potential measures to solve the problems associated with life 
tenure, without abolishing or substantially undermining it, have gone 
unexplored in the legal literature. 
To address that gap, we adopt an incentives approach to Supreme Court 
tenure. Historically, pension reform has been Congress’s most successful 
tool for reducing instances of mental and physical disability on the Court 
and encouraging timely retirement. Building on that track record, we 
 5. See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 247 (2003) (advocating a mandatory retirement age for Justices); 
Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 409 
(concluding that a mandatory age requirement is preferable to term limits); David J. Garrow, Mental 
Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 995, 1086–87 (2000) (supporting mandatory retirement at age seventy-five through constitutional 
amendment); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1202, 1211–12 (1988) (arguing for either a mandatory retirement age or term limits for Justices). 
 6. See, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 471. For more thorough consideration of 
statutory proposals to end life tenure, see infra Part I. 
 7. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 49; Garrow, supra note 5, at 1086; Oliver, 
supra note 3, at 800–01. 
 8. See John M. Broder & Carolyn Marshall, White House Memos Offer Opinions on Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A11. 
 9. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 93–97; Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and 
Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 641 (2005) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Judicial Selection]; Judith Resnik, So Long, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2005, at 20, 
21. 
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propose that Congress create a “golden parachute” for Supreme Court 
Justices by increasing their retirement benefits, especially upon reaching 
an appropriate retirement age or upon certifying a mental or physical 
disability. We also suggest institutional reforms to improve the status and 
security of Justices following retirement. These measures would address 
the most serious shortcomings of life tenure without the upheaval of a 
constitutional amendment and a new tenure regime. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we draw on the text, 
structure, and original meaning of the Constitution to identify three 
constraints on Congress’s power to abolish or circumvent life tenure by 
statute. First, the requirement that judges serve “during good behaviour” 
bars Congress from directly instituting fixed terms or a mandatory 
retirement age by statute. Second, the Constitution requires a separate 
office for “judges of the Supreme Court,” and further prevents Congress 
from depriving Justices of the essential powers and duties of their office. 
Together these constraints mean that Congress cannot indirectly institute 
fixed terms for the Supreme Court, either by taking Justices off of active 
duty following a certain number of years, or by “designating” lower court 
judges to serve on the Supreme Court for a limited time. Third, the tenure 
and salary clauses prevent Congress from interfering with judicial 
independence.  
In Part II, we critically evaluate life tenure, separating real problems 
from the less substantial ones. We acknowledge mental and physical 
infirmity among members of the Supreme Court as a serious and 
continuing concern. Two other widely cited drawbacks of life tenure, 
however, are overblown. First, the supposedly unprecedented increase in 
the average length of service on the Supreme Court is in part a product of 
arbitrary period selection. Calls to return to the length of service imagined 
at the founding ignore evidence that the Founders explicitly contemplated 
terms of thirty or forty years, and that American history has seen periods 
of judicial tenure every bit as long as those that prevail today. Second, 
although we acknowledge that some retirement decisions are based on 
political factors, strategic retirement by Supreme Court Justices is a 
chameleon claim because it is predicated too much on anecdotal evidence. 
Indeed, attempts to empirically verify strategic retirement behavior by 
members of the Supreme Court have largely failed. Moreover, to the 
extent it exists, strategic retirement serves only to slow the pace of 
doctrinal change on the Court—which has at least as many advantages as 
disadvantages. 
Finally, in Part III, we offer our own package of statutory proposals for 
Supreme Court Justices, focusing on inducing retirement through pension 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and modest institutional reform. We begin by analyzing the history of the 
pension system for Article III judges, from the first pension enacted in 
1869 to the more recent easing of the age and service requirements for 
pension qualification in 1984. We then turn our attention to the rich 
empirical literature, which demonstrates that pension qualification has 
been the most important factor in influencing the timing of retirement by 
Supreme Court Justices. We also examine the retirement behavior of two 
comparable actors—tenured faculty members and members of Congress—
both of which display significant responsiveness to early retirement 
incentives. Based on this evidence, we propose a golden parachute for 
Supreme Court Justices who reach some combination of years of service 
and age that equals eighty, or upon certification of a permanent mental or 
physical disability. Rather than a pension annuity that matches their salary 
during active service, we propose that Congress offer Justices an annuity, 
upon retirement, worth twice their salary. The plan will create significant 
economic incentives for retirement and reduce problems of under- and 
over-inclusiveness associated with proposals for a mandatory retirement 
age or term limits. We also propose changes to the current system of 
banishing Senior Justices from the work of the Court and the Supreme 
Court building itself, offering modest institutional reforms that will make 
the office of Senior Justice a more appealing option.  
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP 
There is no shortage of scholars hostile to the concept of life tenure for 
judges.10 Recognizing the extraordinary difficulty of passing a 
constitutional amendment, several of them have switched tactics, 
defending plans to eliminate life tenure by statute. Before proposing our 
own package of statutory proposals and modifications to internal court 
procedures, we first consider the scope of Congress’s power to alter or 
abolish life tenure by statute.  
The debate at the founding gives no indication that Congress enjoys the 
power to modify life tenure. For example, Alexander Hamilton in the 
Federalist Papers and the author of the “Brutus” essays disagreed sharply 
over the virtues of life tenure,11 but neither doubted that the proposed 
 10. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
 11. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly 
one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it 
is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the 
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”), with “BRUTUS” ESSAY XV (Mar. 20, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/1
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Constitution required it.12 The annals of the first Congress likewise reveal 
no discussion of the option to institute a term of years or mandatory 
retirement age for Article III judges.13 Tellingly, when President Jefferson 
grew frustrated with the “farce” of impeachment and led the first charge 
for term limits between 1805 and 1807, he backed constitutional 
amendments on three different occasions but never a statutory solution.14 
The historic presumption should therefore cut strongly against a long-
dormant congressional power to create term limits or a mandatory 
retirement age for federal judges.15 
Perhaps the founding generation simply lacked imagination. For 
instance, a clever (a bit too clever) proposal by Paul Carrington and Roger 
Cramton calls for a statute that effectively limits Supreme Court Justices 
to eighteen-year terms, after which they would serve full-time on lower 
courts and occasionally sit for active Justices in cases of absence or 
recusal.16 The Carrington-Cramton proposal already has garnered 
endorsements “in principle” from more than forty academic 
heavyweights.17 Meanwhile, Steven Calabresi and Jim Lindgren have 
floated a statutory proposal to appoint judges to a lower court and then 
“designate” them as Supreme Court Justices for fixed eighteen-year terms, 
although they ultimately conclude that their plan is unconstitutional.18 
1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 
305 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (“[T]hey have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the 
word. . . . In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under 
heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven 
itself.”), and id. at 307 (criticizing the lack of a provision allowing Congress to remove judges for 
“[e]rrors in judgement, or want of capacity to discharge the duties of the office”). 
 12. Hamilton, discussing the removal of judges, described impeachment as “the only provision 
on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and . . . the 
only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
79, supra note 11, at 474. Yates, meanwhile, denounced the Constitution’s tenure and salary 
protections for creating judges so independent that “no authority . . . can remove them, and they cannot 
be controlled by the laws of the legislature.” “BRUTUS,” supra note 11, at 305. The upshot is that the 
two sides “offered a different assessment” of life tenure, “but not a different reading.” Irving R. 
Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 702 (1979). 
 13. To the contrary, the debates on the Judiciary Act of 1789 suggest that Congress viewed 
impeachment as its sole option after the creation of federal judicial offices. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
828 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Smith of S.C.); id. at 860 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 
 14. See Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from 
History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 694–95 (1969). 
 15. As one member of Congress remarked in 1937 regarding the judiciary’s power to remove its 
own members, “[i]t scarcely can be believed that the framers intended vesting Congress with an 
important power and then so skillfully concealed it [that] it could not be discovered save after 150 
years.” 81 CONG. REC. 6171 (1937) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 16. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 471. 
 17. See id.  
 18. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 78–89. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Judith Resnik has weighed in as well, arguing that Article III permits 
Congress to enact, by statute, either term limits or a mandatory retirement 
age for federal judges.19 Professors John McGinnis and Vikram Amar also 
appear to support a statutory alternative.20 
In this Part, we test those proposals by describing the constitutional 
backdrop against which acts of Congress take place. Drawing on the text, 
structure, and original meaning of the Constitution, we identify three 
constraints on Congress’s ability to abolish or undermine life tenure by 
statute. First, although the words “life tenure” do not appear in Article III, 
the requirement that judges hold office “during good behaviour” operated 
at the founding to define a term of office in addition to a condition of 
forfeiture. Whatever misbehavior meant at the founding, it did not include 
serving eighteen years on the bench or turning seventy. Second, the 
creation of a distinct office for “judges of the Supreme Court” constrains 
Congress’s ability to strip judges of nearly all work on the Court after 
serving a term of years or reaching an age threshold. Congress may add to 
a judge’s duties, as the first Congress did by requiring that Supreme Court 
Justices ride circuit, but it may not subtract from those duties such that the 
person ceases to function as a “judge of the Supreme Court.” Third, the 
tenure and salary clauses prevent Congress from interfering with judicial 
independence. We reject a “flexible” approach to Article III under which 
Congress could limit the tenure or decrease the salaries of federal judges 
so long as the judiciary remains independent by some other measure.  
A. “During Good Behaviour” and Life Tenure 
The most obvious constitutional provision limiting Congress’s ability 
to modify life tenure is Article III, Section 1, which provides that “[t]he 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour.”21 The phrase “during good behaviour” (or rather, 
its Latin equivalent quamdiu se bene gesserit) had appeared in English 
letters patent as early as the fifteenth century,22 and had been required for 
all English judges since Parliament’s Act of Settlement in 1701.23 The Act 
 19. See Resnik, Judicial Selection, supra note 9, at 640–41. 
 20. McGinnis, supra note 3, at 545 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Should 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Be Term-Limited?: A dialogue, WRIT, Aug. 23, 2002, http://writ. 
corporate.findlaw.com/amar/20020823.html. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 22. C. H. McIlwain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 217, 220 (1913). 
 23. 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (1701) (Eng.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/1
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did not apply in the colonies, however,24 where most judges served during 
the pleasure of the King.25 
Paul Carrington, defending his statutory term limits proposal, correctly 
notes that the Constitution never uses the words “life tenure.”26 To imply 
that “during good behaviour” does nothing more than specify a condition 
for forfeiting an office, however, misunderstands the nature of grants of 
office at the founding. Through much of English history, an estate in 
office functioned much like an estate in real property.27 In the eighteenth 
century, for example, the King continued to grant certain offices in fee, in 
fee tail, or for life.28 Consistent with common law rules governing 
transfers of land, a grant of office “during good behaviour” operated to 
create a life estate, defeasible only upon the misbehavior of the 
officeholder. As Bacon’s abridgment explained: 
If an Office be granted to a Man to have and enjoy so long as he 
shall behave himself well in it; the Grantee hath an Estate of 
Freehold in the Office; for since nothing but his Misbehaviour can 
determine his Interest, no Man can prefix a shorter Time than his 
Life; since it must be his own Act (which the Law does not presume 
to foresee) which only can make his Estate of shorter Continuance 
than his Life . . . .29 
At common law, then, the phrase “during good behaviour” had two 
effects: first, it created a condition for forfeiture of the office; and second, 
it precluded other conditions for terminating the office during the life of 
the officeholder. 
Records from the founding era in America confirm that Article III, 
Section 1 granted life tenure for well-behaved judges.30 Hamilton wrote in 
 24. Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 
1104, 1110–11 (1976). 
 25. The Declaration of Independence cited, among its grievances, the fact that the King “made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices.” THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
 26. Webcast: Paul D. Carrington, Presentation at the Duke Law School Symposium: Reforming 
the Supreme Court? (Apr. 9, 2005), http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring05/publiclaw/ 
04092005b.rm.  
 27. McIlwain, supra note 22, at 218 (noting that “there is a feudal element of the tenure, which 
enters into and affects judicial tenure in all its history”). 
 28. 3 MATTHEW BACON, NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 732–33 (3d ed., London, Worrall 
1768) (noting that the offices of Earl Marshall, parkkeeper, forester, jailer, and sheriff may descend as 
inheritances). 
 29. Id. at 733. 
 30. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 491 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed., 1937) (statement of Mr. Pinkney, Sept. 3, 1787) (referring to “[t]he great offices . . . of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Federalist No. 79 that federal judges, “if they behave properly, will be 
secured in their places for life.”31 At the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention, Thomas McKean contrasted the President, who serves a four-
year term, with members of the judiciary, who “may continue for life, if 
they shall so long behave themselves well.”32 Detractors of the proposed 
Constitution apparently shared that view, with Federal Farmer No. 15 
complaining that “[t]he same judge may frequently be in office thirty or 
forty years.”33 In a speech at the Connecticut ratification convention, 
Benjamin Gale quoted the good behavior language and added, “by that I 
understand as long as they live.”34 
The Constitution contains a textual clue as well. Article II, Section 1 
provides that the President “shall hold his Office during the Term of four 
Years.”35 It would be inconsistent for the phrase “he shall hold his office 
during” to precede a clear term of office for the President in Article II, but 
to say nothing about the term of office for judges in Article III. 
Of course, tenure during good behavior differs from true “life tenure” 
in that it ends when a judge misbehaves. Professor Raoul Berger has 
argued that the requirement of good behavior creates an independent basis 
for the removal of judges, outside the impeachment process.36 He notes 
that “misbehavior” was litigated at common law in England using a writ of 
scire facias, which allowed an action in equity against an officeholder to 
determine whether he had forfeited his office.37 Perhaps the proponents of 
statutory term or age limits might argue, like Berger, that “good 
Judiciary Department which are to continue for life”); 1 id. at 138 (statement of Mr. Madison, June 6, 
1787) (speculating on the number of cases of a particular type that “wd. probably arise in the life of a 
Judge”); see also 3 id. at 332 (statement of Mr. Madison in the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788); 2 
id. at 45 n.10 (statement of Mr. Madison, July 18, 1787). 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 11, at 473. 
 32. Thomas McKean, Speech before the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 540–41 (Merrill Jensen 
ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also id. at 545 (stating that “[t]he judges hold 
their offices during life”). 
 33. FEDERAL FARMER NO. 15, reprinted in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE 
REPUBLICAN 101 (Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978). 
 34. Benjamin Gale, Speech Before the Connecticut Convention Election (Nov. 12, 1787), 
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 428. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 36. See Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 
1475, 1487–92, 1527–28 (1970). The orthodox reading, endorsed twice by the Supreme Court, is that 
“the good-behavior language does nothing more than provide a cross-reference to the impeachment 
process.” Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 699 (1999); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); U.S. ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955). 
 37. Berger, supra note 36, at 1479–83. 
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behaviour” incorporates the common law standard for misbehavior 
necessary for the issuance of a writ of scire facias. That standard was 
indeed low and imprecise, allowing forfeiture for “every voluntary act 
done by an officer contrary to that which belongs to his office.”38 A jailer, 
for example, might forfeit his office for negligently allowing escapes,39 
and a recorder might forfeit his office for failure to attend sessions of a 
corporation.40 Although it was never employed against officials 
comparable to federal judges, the writ theoretically applied to all persons 
who held office by letters patent.41 Berger argues that the writ remained 
viable in America at the founding.42 
Even the most aggressive reading of “good behaviour” provides no 
constitutional basis for enacting term limits or a mandatory retirement age 
by statute. At common law, misbehavior simply did not include reaching 
seventy years of age or serving eighteen years on the bench. At a 
minimum, the writ required some misfeasance or nonfeasance “contrary to 
the Duty of his Office.”43 Growing old is neither an act nor an omission—
it is not even “behavior,” let alone “misbehavior”—and nothing about 
advanced age or lengthy tenure is inconsistent with judicial office.44 
Moreover, it was typically the King who brought a writ of scire facias, and 
judges of the equity courts who decided whether the officer had 
misbehaved.45 Parliament played no role in creating, initiating, or deciding 
the writ, which makes the device unhelpful as precedent for statutory 
modifications to life tenure.46 Berger himself concedes that the 
 38. Henry v. Barkley, (1597) 79 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224 (K.B.). Similar standards appear in 
founding-era abridgments. See, e.g., 16 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND 
EQUITY 121 (2d ed., London, G.G.J. and J. Robinson 1793) (“If he does contrary to the duty of his 
office, as if he doth not right to the parties, this misfeasance is forfeiture.”). 
 39. 16 VINER, supra note 38, at 121. 
 40. R v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, (1706) 91 Eng. Rep. 378, 378 (K.B.).  
 41. See Berger, supra note 36, at 1480–81. 
 42. Id. at 1483. A number of scholars have disputed the viability of scire facias in America. See, 
e.g., Kaufman, supra note 12, at 694–98; Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American 
Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138. 
 43. 3 BACON, supra note 28, at 741. 
 44. To be sure, growing older makes some (debatable) forms of “misbehavior,” like physical or 
mental disability, more likely. But a writ of scire facias would issue only against individual officials, 
based on their individual misbehavior. In contrast, term limits and a mandatory age requirement would 
operate automatically against all judges. 
 45. 4 BACON, supra note 28, at 415–16.  
 46. Besides, the writ provided paper-thin protection for judges. The King, or even a private 
citizen, was free to target officials for political reasons. See 4 BACON, supra note 28, at 416. And 
although the King could not formally remove a judge who held office during good behavior without 
scire facias, he could strip the judge of all powers and duties at any time. For example, in 1672, when 
Sir John Archer of the court of common pleas insisted on scire facias rather than surrender his office, 
the King ordered him to stop serving as a judge, named a replacement to the court, and likely even 
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Constitution forbids all forms of congressional removal outside the 
impeachment process.47 
The requirement that judges hold office “during good behaviour” 
prevents Congress from directly creating term limits or a mandatory 
retirement age for judges by statute. The founding generation understood 
Article III, Section 1 to guarantee life tenure to judges who behave well. 
Accordingly, neither the English common law tradition nor the 
Constitution supports removal of a judge based on a definition of 
“misbehavior” that includes aging or service for a certain term of years. 
B. The Essential Powers and Duties of a Supreme Court Justice 
The Constitution further constrains Congress’s ability to circumvent 
life tenure by requiring a separate “office” for Supreme Court Justices. On 
any fair textual reading, the Constitution creates three distinct judicial 
offices: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, judges of the Supreme Court, 
and judges of the inferior courts. The Constitution does not demand 
absolute separation between these offices. Based on the text and the 
original meaning of judicial “office,” however, the Constitution does 
assign to judges a set of essential powers and duties, which includes the 
adjudication of disputes that come before their assigned court. Congress 
may add to a judge’s responsibilities, subject only to the requirement of 
reappointment for duties wholly nongermane to the office. But Congress 
may not subtract responsibilities in a way that strips a judge of the 
essential powers and duties associated with the office.  
Based on this standard, we defend the results of the abysmally reasoned 
Stuart v. Laird,48 which in 1803 upheld Congress’s power to require that 
Supreme Court Justices ride circuit. That power does not, however, enable 
Congress to banish a Supreme Court Justice to the lower courts after 
stripped him of his salary, leaving him to collect only fees until his death. McIlwain, supra note 22, at 
223. Given Article III’s other strong guarantees of judicial independence, it seems unlikely that the 
Constitution at the same time tacitly imitated the weaker scire facias regime. 
 Notably, Parliament had a separate mechanism for removing judges that was far more effective 
than impeachment. Under the Act of Settlement, Parliament could remove any judge, without cause, 
by “address” through a vote of both houses. See 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (1701) (Eng.). The Framers 
considered and rejected a congressional power of removal by address, although some state 
constitutions that provided judges with tenure during good behavior allowed the state legislature to 
remove judges on address. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the 
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 36 (1998). 
 47. See Berger, supra note 36, at 1526. Berger sees scire facias as an historical precedent 
establishing that the judiciary may remove its own members for misbehavior, see id.—a dubious 
proposition given that the judiciary had no power to initiate scire facias at common law. 
 48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
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eighteen years or at age seventy. Those actions would deprive Justices of 
the essential powers and duties assigned by the Constitution to “judges of 
the Supreme Court.” 
1. Separate Offices for “Judges of the Supreme Court” 
An important threshold consideration is whether the Constitution 
creates a distinct office for Supreme Court Justices. Carrington and 
Cramton contend that “Congress has broad power to define and redefine 
the ‘Office’ of a federal judge” and that “intermixture of duties on the 
Supreme Court with those of a lower Article III court is constitutionally 
permissible.”49 If they are correct, then Congress could circumvent life 
tenure on the Supreme Court through a statute that either (1) demotes 
Supreme Court Justices to an inferior court after a term of years,50 or (2) 
promotes inferior-court judges to the Supreme Court for a term of years.51 
We take issue with both proposals because, on a fair reading of its text and 
structure, the Constitution contemplates separate offices for judges of the 
Supreme Court and judges of the inferior courts.  
Again, the starting point is Article III, Section 1, which provides that 
“[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour.”52 Two constructions of this language are 
possible: first, that it contemplates two distinct categories of judges, either 
of the Supreme Court or the inferior courts (the “separate offices 
reading”); and second, that it contemplates a single category of federal 
judges who may serve on the Supreme Court, the lower courts, or both 
(the “overlapping offices reading”).53 Surprisingly, the scholarly consensus 
 49. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic 
Principles, July 25, 2005, http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm 
(elaborating on the holding of Stuart v. Laird). 
 50. This is the substance of the Carrington-Cramton proposal, under which Supreme Court 
Justices would change status after an eighteen-year term. See id. Such Justices would retain life tenure 
by serving full-time on the lower courts. Id. They would also remain eligible to participate in Supreme 
Court decisions in cases where an active Justice could not, due to absence or recusal. Id. After their 
eighteen-year terms, however, Justices would have no power to vote in the overwhelming majority of 
Supreme Court decisions. 
 51. This is the substance of a proposal by Calabresi and Lindgren, under which the President 
would appoint, and the Senate would confirm, an already-confirmed inferior-court judge to serve an 
eighteen-year stint on the Supreme Court. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 79–81. When this 
“designation” expired, Supreme Court Justices would automatically revert to their original positions on 
the lower courts. Id. Professor McGinnis supports a similar “Supreme Court riding” proposal, except 
that the term is much shorter under his plan. See McGinnis, supra note 3, at 541.  
 52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 53. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Terms of Justices of the Supreme Court, 
in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 362–63, supra note 3. 
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is that this provision, standing alone, is ambiguous,54 although Professor 
McGinnis concedes that the first reading is the “most natural.”55 
We find no such ambiguity. First, the words “both . . . and” draw an 
unmistakable distinction between the supreme and inferior courts. Second, 
the comma before “both” indicates that the phrase “both of the supreme 
and inferior Courts” modifies the word “judges.” The phrase therefore 
describes two distinct kinds of judges, those “of” the Supreme Court and 
those “of” the inferior courts, and specifies that the rest of the sentence 
applies to “both.” Third, it is difficult to see what the phrase “both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts” accomplishes if it does not divide judicial 
offices among the two types of courts. The preceding sentence established 
the Supreme Court and gave Congress the option of creating inferior 
courts,56 so there was no need to reiterate that the courts themselves are 
different. If the intention had been to permit judicial offices that straddle 
the two, the sentence simply could have read: “The judges shall hold their 
offices during good behaviour.” The words “both of the supreme and 
inferior Courts” do nothing but confirm that life tenure applies to both 
Supreme Court judges and inferior court judges. Under the overlapping 
offices reading, that phrase is surplusage.57 
The Constitution uses the same sentence structure in two other 
provisions, both of which reinforce the separate offices reading. The 
Presidential Succession Clause in Article II, Section 1 allows Congress to 
provide for “the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of 
the President and Vice President.”58 Similarly, the Oath or Affirmation 
Clause of Article VI applies to “all executive and judicial Officers, both of 
the United States and of the several States.”59 If the claim is that “X, both 
of Y and Z” leaves ambiguous whether Y and Z represent distinct offices, 
then these provisions should create ambiguity as to whether the President 
and Vice President have distinct offices, or whether offices of the United 
States are distinct from offices of the several states.60 Both propositions 
 54. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 86; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 49; 
Harrison, supra note 53, at 362; McGinnis, supra note 3, at 545. 
 55. McGinnis, supra note 3, at 545. 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
 57. One of the most enduring rules of constitutional construction is that no provision is “mere 
surplus[]age, is entirely without meaning.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  
 59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 60. If the slightly more refined claim is that “X, both of Y and Z” leaves ambiguous whether X 
can be “of” Y and Z at once, then these provisions should create ambiguity about whether the 
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are absurd.61 The similar language in these two other provisions lays to 
rest any ambiguity as to whether judges of the supreme and inferior courts 
hold separate offices. 
It may border on overkill, then, to point to the Appointments Clause in 
Article II, Section 2, which provides that the President “shall appoint . . . 
Judges of the supreme Court,” as well as “all other Officers of the United 
States.”62 As Justice Story pointed out in his Commentaries in 1833,63 this 
express reference to judges of the Supreme Court, alongside other distinct 
offices like ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, “disambiguates” Article 
III and makes the separate offices reading persuasive.64 Moreover, the 
Constitution creates a third distinct judicial office, with a unique function 
in the impeachment process, by requiring in Article I, Section 3 that 
“[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall 
preside.”65 The office of Chief Justice cuts against the overlapping offices 
reading, under which all federal judges belong to an undifferentiated mass. 
Based on Article III and related provisions, the best reading is that the 
Constitution creates separate offices for judges of the Supreme Court. 
2. The Essential Powers and Duties of “Judges” 
The fact that the Constitution demands a distinct office for judges of 
the Supreme Court only partly answers whether Congress can rotate 
Supreme Court Justices to the lower courts after a fixed term of years. 
Two questions remain. First, given the requirement of “separate offices,” 
can Congress assign any lower court duties to members of the Supreme 
Court? Second, if so, can Congress assign principally or exclusively lower 
court duties to members of the Supreme Court? The first question goes to 
Congress’s ability to add to the duties of a judge’s office, while the second 
question goes to Congress’s ability to subtract from the duties of a judge’s 
office. 
President and Vice President may somehow suffer the same death, or whether a judge can hold an 
office consisting of duties on both federal and state courts. The former is logically impossible, and the 
latter seems inconsistent with Article III, which refers only to the judicial power of the United States. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (creating separate offices for the President and Vice 
President); U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to nominate and appoint 
officers of the United States). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 63. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 437 n.1 
(Boston, Hilliard 1833) (finding it “manifest, that the constitution contemplated distinct appointments 
of the judges of the courts of the United States” and concluding that Supreme Court Justices are 
“expressly appointed for that court, and for that court only”). 
 64. Harrison, supra note 53, at 363; see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 87. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1397 Stras Scott book pages.doc 5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adding powers and duties to an office is almost always permissible. 
Even offices that are separate need not have mutually exclusive duties.66 In 
fact, Congress’s power to add duties has been tested twice in Appointment 
Clause controversies. The Court held in 1893 that “Congress may increase 
the power and duties of an existing office without thereby rendering it 
necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated and appointed,” 
as long as the “additional duties [are] germane to the offices already 
held.”67 The Court applied this germaneness standard (with less than full 
enthusiasm) again in 1994 in Weiss v. United States.68 It concluded that the 
duties of military judges were germane to the duties of commissioned 
military officers, noting that all officers enjoyed the power to quell 
quarrels, impose nonjudicial disciplinary punishments, and serve as a 
summary court-martial.69 Because this germaneness analysis appears to 
turn on the character of the assigned duties, it would take something 
jarring—along the lines of the nonjudicial business assigned to the courts 
in Hayburn’s Case70—to qualify. Accordingly, Congress may add 
additional duties, especially ordinary judicial duties, to a judicial office 
without violating the Appointments Clause. 
Subtracting powers and duties from an office is far more problematic. 
In some cases, the Constitution expressly assigns powers to a particular 
office. Congress could not outlaw recess appointments, for example, 
because the Constitution expressly grants that power to the President.71 
But what if the Constitution is silent? The vast majority of federal offices 
are entirely creatures of statute. A few others, like “ambassadors” and 
“judges,” are named in the Constitution but are assigned no specific duties. 
Does that mean Congress may freely revoke their powers and reassign 
them? 
We begin with the basic but essential point that all “offices” carry with 
them certain powers and duties. Bacon’s abridgment nicely summarized 
the notion of an office under English common law: “It is said, that the 
 66. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the addition of nonjudicial duties to the offices 
of federal judges. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (upholding the requirement that 
federal judges serve on the U.S. Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680–84 
(1988) (upholding the participation of judges, through the Special Division, in administrative duties 
relating to the independent counsel investigating officers of the Executive branch). 
 67. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893). 
 68. 510 U.S. 163, 174–75 (1994) (assuming arguendo that the germaneness standard applied). 
Justices Scalia and Thomas found the germaneness standard controlling. Id. at 196 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 69. Id. at 174–75 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court). 
 70. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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Word Officium principally implies a Duty, and in the next Place the 
Charge of such Duty.”72 Blackstone dedicated a chapter of his 
Commentaries to the “rights and duties” of the King’s subordinate 
officers,73 and described the writ of mandamus as an action to compel the 
judges of any inferior court “to do justice according to the powers of their 
office.”74 As discussed above, whenever an officer’s misbehavior was 
litigated at common law, the inquiry turned on whether he had acted 
“contrary to the Duty of his Office.”75 A half-dozen drafts and speeches 
preserved in Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention make 
explicit reference to the powers and duties of executive officers.76  
Even when the Constitution does not detail the responsibilities of an 
office, it contemplates that every officer has certain duties. Consider the 
Opinions Clause of Article II, Section 2, which grants the President the 
power to demand a written opinion from “the principal Officer in each of 
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”77 The Constitution never elaborates on those “duties.” 
It never even names any departments, although it obviously creates a 
distinct office for department heads.78 Nonetheless, the Opinions Clause 
makes clear that those officers have duties (beyond the duty to provide 
written opinions).79 
In several places, the Constitution creates offices without express 
powers and duties but with well-defined implied powers and duties. For 
example, the Appointments Clause refers to the office of 
 72. 3 BACON, supra note 28, at 718 (footnote omitted). The abridgment also captures the 
principle that an office requires the exercise of some power: “[I]t is a Rule, that where one Man hath to 
do with another’s Affairs against his Will, and without his Leave, that this is an Office, and he who is 
in it is an Officer.” Id. 
 73. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *327–53 (discussing at length “the rights and 
duties of the principal subordinate magistrates”). 
 74. 3 id. *110. 
 75. 3 BACON, supra note 28, at 741. For a fuller discussion of scire facias and the common law 
standard for misbehavior, see supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
 76. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 30, at 499 (proposed 
amendment reported by Mr. Brearly, Sept. 4, 1787); 2 id. at 495 (same); 2 id. at 329 (statement of Mr. 
Gerry, Aug. 18, 1787); 2 id. at 185 (proposed plan presented by Mr. Rutledge, Aug. 6, 1787); 1 id. at 
145 (statement of Mr. Dickerson, June 6, 1787); 1 id. at 140 (statement of Mr. Wilson, June 6, 1787); 
1 id. at 68 (statement of Mr. Sherman, June 1, 1787).  
 77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 78. In addition to the Opinions Clause, the Appointments Clause recognizes a separate office for 
executive department heads. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing Congress to vest the 
appointment of inferior officers in “the Heads of Departments,” among others). 
 79. Thus, a statute that stripped an officer of all powers and duties, leaving nothing but an empty 
shell and a paycheck, would violate the constitutional notion of an “office.” 
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“Ambassador[].”80 Although the Constitution nowhere describes the 
responsibilities of that office, the post of ambassador had certain clearly 
understood powers and duties at the founding.81 By naming the office, the 
Constitution incorporates those powers and duties into the job description. 
For example, Congress could not pass a statute stripping the Ambassador 
to Japan of the power to communicate with the Japanese. Communication 
with foreign governments is among the essential powers and duties of an 
“ambassador,” and is therefore implicitly required by the Constitution. 
Likewise, the Constitution creates separate offices for “judges of the 
Supreme Court”82 without expressly defining their powers and duties. By 
using the word “judges,”83 however, the Constitution incorporates the 
essential powers and duties of a judge, as understood at the founding. The 
most basic, almost tautological, power of a judge is the power to 
adjudicate disputes that come before the court to which he is assigned.84 
That power does not extend to every case, of course, as even at the 
founding judges were required to recuse themselves from disputes in 
which they had various forms of personal interest.85 But especially for 
judges on the highest appellate court in a jurisdiction, that power includes 
the presumptive right to cast a vote in every dispute. At the founding, 
judges in the Exchequer Chamber in England enjoyed that right.86 Indeed, 
by 1787 the high courts (or comparable hybrid bodies) of most states had 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 81. See, e.g., 1 BACON, supra note 28, at 85 (“An Ambassador is a Person sent by one Sovereign 
Prince to another, to transact in the Place of his Sovereign such Matters as relate to both States.” 
(footnotes omitted)); 1 THE LAW-DICTIONARY 83 (Giles Jacob ed., 1st Philadelphia ed. 1811) (same). 
 82. See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President power to appoint “Judges of the supreme 
Court”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that “the 
Judges in every State shall be bound” by the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States). 
 84. Cf. 1 BACON, supra note 28, at 555 (noting that all judges must “exercise [their authority] in 
a legal Manner, and hold their Courts in their proper Persons, for they cannot act by Deputy, nor any 
way transfer their Power to another”). That Article III, Section 2 grants original and appellate 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court reinforces the notion that judges hold some implied powers and 
duties. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 85. See 1 BACON, supra note 28, at 556 (noting, for example, that “[n]o Person can be a Judge in 
his own Cause”) (footnote omitted). 
 86. See 6 VINER, supra note 38, at 501 (describing the Exchequer Chamber, which assembled 
“all the Justices” to hear errors from the King’s Bench); see also ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF 
COURTS 21 (1940) (discussing the development of the English appellate jurisdiction). The House of 
Lords, which had the final say on questions of law in England, likewise granted its members the 
presumptive right to vote on each matter before the body. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: 
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 97–98 (1993) (“In 1774 the House of Lords decided cases by a general 
vote of the peers, lawyers and laymen alike”). Although some state constitutions initially vested 
powers of appellate review in legislative bodies, the U.S. Constitution explicitly rejected that 
approach. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 11, at 483. 
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express quorum rules that required some minimum number of judges to be 
present and cast votes in order to hold court.87 Of course, statutory term-
limits proposals or a mandatory retirement age go much further than 
removing the presumptive power of Supreme Court Justices to vote in 
every case. Instead, these proposals mean that, after attaining a certain age 
or tenure, a Justice presumptively will not vote in any case before the 
Court.  
The original public meaning of the “office” of a “judge” has two 
consequences for the power of Congress. Congress may add to the 
responsibilities of an office, subject only to the requirement of 
germaneness. Yet Congress may not subtract from the responsibilities of 
an office in a way that deprives officers of the essential powers and duties 
of the office. For judges, those powers include adjudicating disputes that 
come before the court to which they are assigned. 
3. Altering the Duties of Supreme Court Justices by Statute 
Based on the “essential powers and duties” standard, we next test the 
constitutionality of four actual and proposed acts of Congress: (1) circuit 
riding; (2) sitting by designation, whether downward, lateral, or upward; 
(3) taking Supreme Court Justices out of the full-time rotation after 
eighteen years, as in the Carrington-Cramton proposal; and (4) designating 
lower court judges to the Supreme Court for eighteen-year terms. 
The first and oldest practice we consider is “circuit riding,” established 
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and finally discontinued in 1891.88 
Circuit riding required Supreme Court Justices to appear on inferior circuit 
courts spread throughout the nation.89 By all accounts, it was a miserable 
part of the job.90 In 1803, the Supreme Court expressly upheld circuit 
riding against constitutional challenge in Stuart v. Laird.91 The Court’s 
discussion (all 119 words) noted simply that any constitutional objection 
“is of recent date” and that “practice and acquiescence under it for a period 
of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, 
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”92 
 87. See POUND, supra note 86, at 92–102.  
 88. Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1755 (2003). 
 89. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75 (1789). 
 90. See Letter from John Jay et al. to President George Washington (Aug. 9, 1792), in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 163–64 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).  
 91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
 92. Id. Whatever the merit of claims stating that longstanding practice, unbroken since the 
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Professors Calabresi and Lindgren find this analysis “not completely 
persua[sive],” both because extensive circuit riding duties are non-
germane to the appointed office and because they pose “a threat to judicial 
independence.”93  
To the contrary, we find circuit riding as practiced in the Court’s early 
years to be constitutionally sound as an original matter.94 As detailed 
above, we agree that the text of the Constitution requires a distinct office 
for judges of the Supreme Court.95 But giving Supreme Court Justices 
some responsibilities on the lower courts does not run afoul of that 
requirement. Riding circuit added to the responsibilities of the office but in 
no way deprived judges of the Supreme Court of the essential powers and 
duties of their office.96 They retained the presumptive right to adjudicate 
every dispute before the Court.97 True, circuit riding imposed an 
opportunity cost.98 The Court would have been vastly more productive 
founding, is ipso facto constitutional, it is difficult to accept that a widely criticized practice becomes 
immune from constitutional scrutiny after only thirteen years of noncontinuous “acquiescence.” See id. 
at 305–06 (remarks of Mr. Lee, counsel for plaintiff in error) (noting that circuit riding existed from 
1789 to 1801 but was eliminated, then reinstated, by the judiciary acts of 1801 and 1802, respectively). 
 93. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 84. Calabresi and Lindgren’s main point, with which 
we wholeheartedly agree, is that the circuit riding precedent is so questionable that it should not be 
expanded to justify statutory term limit proposals. Id. at 85–86. 
 94. Circuit riding was not an innovation of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Both colonial courts and 
pre-constitutional state court systems commonly required circuit riding by high court judges. 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 123 (1973). During the ratification 
debates, the only apparent concern about circuit riding was that the large size of the republic would 
make it impractical and time-consuming, not that the practice would violate the Constitution. See A 
Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 32, at 193, 195 (worrying about the consequences of federal circuit riding); AM. HERALD, Jan. 7, 
1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 636, 639 (predicting that the Court 
would become “too bloated to go to the extensive circuit of all America”).  
 95. See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Harrison, supra note 53, at 368 n.21 (noting that “[c]ircuit riding was in addition to 
service on the Court,” and not “a substitute for service on the Court”). 
 97. Circuit riding did marginally increase the number of recusals because a Justice who heard a 
case in a lower court often did not participate in any appeal before the Supreme Court. In Stuart v. 
Laird, Chief Justice Marshall sat out for precisely this reason. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 (1803). It 
also undoubtedly increased the number of times a Justice could not hear Supreme Court cases because 
of delays in travel. 
 98. Calabresi and Lindgren take this notion seriously, and appear to draw the line at “the very 
onerous lower court duties imposed on Supreme Court justices during our early constitutional era.” 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 84. Their analysis hinges on the germaneness requirement of 
the Appointments Clause under Weiss. At some point, they argue, duties on the lower courts can 
become so demanding that they are nongermane to the office of Supreme Court Justice. See id. at 82–
83. That reading of Weiss is misguided, however, as the germaneness standard looks to the character 
of the additional duties, not to the amount of additional work. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 
174–76 (1994); see supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. In Weiss, the duties of military judges 
were germane to the duties of commissioned officers not because they took up so little time, but 
because the existing disciplinary powers of officers resembled the judicial powers of military judges. 
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without long periods of travel every year. But the Constitution demands no 
minimum workload for the Supreme Court.99 Because the Justices 
continued to exercise their essential powers and duties on the Court, 
circuit riding was and is constitutional.100 
A second practice, still common today, allows federal judges to “sit by 
designation” on lower federal courts other than those to which they were 
appointed. For example, active and senior district court judges might sit by 
designation on appellate court panels, or senior circuit court judges might 
sit by designation on a different circuit.101 Active Supreme Court Justices 
occasionally sit by designation on lower courts as well.102 Downward, 
lateral, and upward designation raise different concerns analytically. 
We conclude that, as practiced today, sitting by designation does not 
contravene the separate offices requirement.103 Supreme Court Justices 
sitting by designation on a lower court (“downward” designation) is 
conceptually identical to circuit riding, assuming that the Justices still have 
the ability to vote on Supreme Court matters. Lower court judges sitting 
by designation on other lower courts (“lateral” designation) likewise does 
not deprive judges of ordinary decision-making power on their “home” 
court.104 The power of Congress to constitute the inferior courts and to 
Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174–76. Thus, although we reach the same conclusion as Calabresi and Lindgren, 
we premise our argument on the essential powers and duties of “judges of the Supreme Court” rather 
than on the germaneness test of the Appointments Clause. 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 100. Two other factors provide further support for the conclusion that circuit riding was 
constitutional as an original matter. First, for federal judges, the practice began with the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which was written by “essentially the same men who wrote Article III in 1787.” Susan Low 
Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. 
COMMENT. 607, 610 n.11 (2001). Second, circuit riding was commonplace not only in state courts, but 
also in England, where appellate judges sat in courts of nisi prius—essentially trial courts within the 
King’s Bench. See James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s 
Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1564 (2001). Neither factor fully answers the 
question, but both cut in favor of the constitutionality of circuit riding. 
 101. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 291–92, 294 (2000) (circuit and senior judges, respectively). 
 102. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (allowing Supreme Court Justices to sit as judges of the courts of 
appeal to which they are assigned as Circuit Justices). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist famously sat 
by designation as a district court judge in a 1986 civil trial in the Northern District of Virginia. On 
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, per curiam. Heislup v. Town of Colonial 
Beach, Va., Nos. 84-2143, 85-1128, 1986 WL 18609, at *10 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 1986). 
 103. Senior judges may raise other constitutional concerns, for example, under the Appointments 
Clause. See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional? (forthcoming).  
 104. Harrison sees a potential problem when district court judges sit by designation on the 
Supreme Court. The relationship among levels of the federal judiciary, he explains, is “not 
symmetrical.” Harrison, supra note 53, at 364. The concern apparently reflects his belief that circuit 
riding can be defended as “an aspect of the[] [C]ourt’s appellate jurisdiction”—an extension of its 
supervisory function. Id. at 365 n.16. Because we ground our standard in the essential powers and 
duties of judicial office, and not on the particulars of a federal judicial hierarchy that Congress could 
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define their jurisdiction strongly suggests that it may authorize lower 
courts to share personnel on occasion.105 
Whether lower court judges may occasionally sit by designation on the 
Supreme Court (“upward” designation) is a tougher question, and 
thankfully, a novel one. Something akin to upward designation occurred in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (“Alcoa”), the landmark 
antitrust case in which the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum and 
referred the appeal to a special panel of the Second Circuit led by Judge 
Learned Hand.106 The case is widely treated as having the binding 
precedential force of a Supreme Court decision.107 Under our standard, the 
practice of “upward” designation certainly would not violate the 
requirement of a separate office for inferior courts, assuming the lower 
court judges continued to exercise the essential powers and duties of that 
office. Although we do not rule out the possibility of “upward” 
designation, we note a potential textual objection to the practice: Article 
III creates “one supreme Court,”108 and designees from other courts 
arguably interfere with both its singularity and its supremacy. 
A third proposal, which would take Supreme Court Justices out of 
active rotation after eighteen years, would be unconstitutional. The 
Carrington-Cramton proposal would allow Senior Justices, after a fixed 
term, to continue as life-tenured judges on the lower courts, with the 
possibility of occasionally sitting when active Supreme Court Justices 
cannot participate.109 There is no question that under this plan, “[a]fter 
eighteen years, [J]ustices would participate little or perhaps not at all.”110 
Because the essential powers and duties of a “judge” include the power to 
adjudicate disputes that come before the court, any plan that exiles 
Supreme Court Justices to the lower courts after serving a term of years or 
reaching a certain age would violate the Constitution. 
alter at any time, we have no trouble with district court judges sitting by designation on appellate 
courts. We note that our standard seems fully compatible with Harrison’s notion of “participation in 
substantially all” the work of the Court. Id. at 366. 
 105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; cf. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441, 448–49 (1850) (holding that the greater power to abolish the lower federal courts includes 
the lesser power to control their jurisdiction). 
 106. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 107. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (citing Alcoa and noting 
that the decision “was decided . . . under unique circumstances which add to its weight as a 
precedent”); James J. Friedberg, The Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The 
Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 289, 298 n.31 (1991) (“[T]he 
opinion holds the authority of a de facto Supreme Court decision.”). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 109. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 471. 
 110. Harrison, supra note 53, at 367. 
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Fourth, however it is framed, “designating” a sitting Article III judge 
by renomination and reconfirmation to an eighteen-year statutory stint on 
the Supreme Court would be unconstitutional. As described by Calabresi 
and Lindgren, the proposal relies on an underlying fiction that the lower 
court judge remains a lower court judge throughout his tenure on the 
Supreme Court.111 If believed, however, the fiction means that there are 
never any “judges of the Supreme Court”–only statutory designees—
which seems obviously to violate the separate offices requirement.112 On 
the other hand, if the fiction is rejected, the proposal would create full-
fledged judges of the Supreme Court, only to improperly strip them of 
their power to adjudicate cases before that Court after eighteen years. 
Either way, as Calabresi and Lindgren ultimately acknowledge, the 
proposal is unavailing.113 
C. Judicial Independence 
A third, frequently discussed limitation on Congress’s power to abolish 
life tenure by statute derives from the principle of judicial independence. 
The Constitution’s signature protections of judicial independence are its 
tenure and salary clauses, which provide that federal judges “shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for 
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.”114 Hamilton dedicated The Federalist Nos. 78 and 
79 to explaining the importance of the tenure and salary provisions, 
respectively, to “[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice.”115 
He viewed judges “who hold their offices by a temporary commission” 
incapable of adequately guarding constitutional rights, and wrote that 
“[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, 
would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence.”116 
He also famously defended salary protection by observing that “a power 
over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”117 
 111. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 80–81. 
 112. Conversely, designees would sit full-time on the Supreme Court while doing little or no work 
on their ostensible “home” court, preventing them from carrying out the essential powers and duties of 
their office.  
 113. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 89. 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 11, at 466; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 79; see also United 
States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567–68 (2001) (discussing Hamilton’s views on the importance of the 
salary and tenure clauses to judicial independence). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 11, at 471.  
 117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 11, at 472. That the tenure and salary clauses prohibited 
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Critics of life tenure have argued that lengthy nonrenewable terms or a 
generally applicable mandatory retirement age would pose no risk to 
judicial independence. To be sure, the Framers could have adopted other 
regimes to protect judicial independence. Whether or not tenure and salary 
protections were the right choice, however, they were the founders’ 
choice. Hamilton’s case for life tenure carried the day in 1787. 
We are therefore puzzled by the persistence of arguments that Congress 
may ignore the tenure and salary clauses so long as it protects some level 
of judicial independence. Professors Kramer and Baron argued that, 
because it would not violate “the underlying principle of article III 
tenure—the independence of federal judges,” a statutory mandatory 
retirement age would be constitutional.118 Similarly, Carrington and 
Cramton argue that their plan is constitutional precisely because it 
“protects judicial independence just as well as do current 
arrangements.”119 Judith Resnik defends statutes that would abolish life 
tenure on the grounds that “this part of the Constitution is not one in which 
forms of originalism or textualism have had much sway.”120 
It is a bold claim coming from serious constitutional scholars. Even 
those who applaud the Supreme Court’s flexible approach to Article III’s 
vesting language in Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor121 
ought to swallow hard before brazenly overriding the unambiguous 
commands of the tenure and salary clauses. Congress does not have the 
power, in the name of functionalism, to circumvent the express language 
of Article III without a constitutional amendment.  
fixed terms for judges was clear not only to proponents of the Constitution like Hamilton but also to its 
opponents, who complained that Article III did not permit periodical appointments for judges, 
comparable to those served by members of Congress. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, 
at 440 (statement of Col. Jeremiah Halsey & Mr. Wheeler Coit, Preston, Conn., Nov. 26, 1787). 
 118. Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory 
Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of “During Good Behaviour,” 35 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 469 (1967). 
 119. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 49 (advancing a “purposive or functionalist reading” 
of Article III, Section 1). 
 120. Resnik, Judicial Selection, supra note 9, at 641. She is certainly incorrect as to the tenure and 
salary protections, as the Supreme Court’s Compensation Clause decisions have taken a surprisingly 
hard line on even indirect diminishments of salary. See Hatter, 532 U.S. at 576. 
 121. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Briefly, the “flexible approach” of Schor at least arguably honors the 
requirement that the judicial power of the United States “shall be vested in” federal courts, in that it 
considers the degree to which a statute creating Article I tribunals reserves to Article III courts “the 
‘essential attributes of judicial power,’” for example, by preserving some form of appeal to the Article 
III judiciary. Id. at 851; see also Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and 
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 267–68 (1990) (discussing necessity of 
judicial power over administrative adjudication). No such argument can be made on behalf of a 
statutory term limits proposal, which unapologetically violates the text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/1
p1397 Stras Scott book pages.doc 5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LIFE TENURE AND A “GOLDEN PARACHUTE” 1421 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A “functional” reading of Article III does particular violence to the 
Compensation Clause. Presumably it would allow Congress to freely 
diminish judicial salaries for budgetary reasons, as long as the cuts were 
not subjectively motivated by retaliation.122 Moreover, on purely 
functional grounds, ignoring the text of Article III in favor of an 
ephemeral requirement of judicial independence ultimately weakens 
judicial independence because it invites Congress to push the envelope.123 
Taken together, the Constitution’s tenure and salary protections provide 
robust protection for judicial independence. We decline to adopt an 
interpretation of Article III that transforms judicial independence from a 
constraint on Congress into an invitation for Congress to experiment with 
alternatives to tenure and salary protections.124 
II. IN DEFENSE OF LIFE TENURE 
The Constitution prevents Congress from tinkering with life tenure 
through the ordinary legislative process. Most scholars, however, argue 
that term limits or a mandatory retirement age should be implemented 
through a constitutional amendment.125 Accordingly, we now take up the 
longstanding policy debate over the substantive merits of life tenure.126  
First, we present two affirmative reasons for retaining life tenure. One 
emphasizes the legitimacy of the courts. Life tenure means slower 
turnover on the Supreme Court, which has the salutary effect of ensuring 
gradual development of the law and less frequent reversals. The other 
emphasizes the independence of the courts. Life tenure has the unique 
 122. The Court’s decision in Hatter, 532 U.S. at 576, is to the contrary. 
 123. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, 90–92 (describing the practical risks of statutory 
term limits, including the prospect that an incoming party would reinstitute life tenure upon taking 
control); Harrison, supra note 53, at 372 (same). 
 124. The tenure and salary clauses do not represent the only constitutional source that shields 
judicial independence. The separation of powers, implicit in the Constitution’s structure, also prohibits 
the legislative branch from interfering with the independence of the judiciary. In Mistretta v. United 
States, for example, the Court applied a separation of powers analysis to the President’s power to 
appoint federal judges to the U.S. Sentencing Commission and subsequently remove them, noting that 
“the independence of the Judicial Branch must be ‘jealously guarded’ against outside interference.” 
488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 
(1982)). The separation of powers prohibits “encroachment and aggrandizement” by any branch, and 
in particular shields courts from interference that would undermine public confidence in their 
impartiality. Id. at 382.  
 125. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 126. To call the scholarly discourse over life tenure a “debate” may give too much credit to those, 
like us, who defend life tenure. As Calabresi and Lindgren note, few principled defenses of life tenure 
have appeared in the literature. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 19. It is our hope to add to 
this discourse. 
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advantage of insulating judges from having to please political 
constituencies in order to secure another political office following 
departure from the judiciary. 
Second, we respond to the three most powerful critiques of life tenure. 
The first, grounded in concerns about democratic accountability, is that the 
average length of terms served by Supreme Court Justices has 
dramatically increased since 1971, impairing the ability of the political 
branches to assert regular majoritarian influence over the Court. The 
second is that Justices engage in strategic retirement behavior to ensure a 
like-minded successor. The third is that some judges suffer from mental or 
physical infirmity but refuse to leave the bench. 
Third, we argue that, to the extent that others find them convincing, 
these criticisms are better addressed by less drastic means than 
constitutional amendment. Congress can promote shorter terms that 
provide greater democratic accountability, blunt incentives for strategic 
retirement, and encourage Justices who suffer from mental and physical 
infirmity to retire, all while retaining life tenure. 
A. An Affirmative Case for Life Tenure 
Before responding to the well-known criticisms of life tenure, we 
present an affirmative case for retaining life tenure by pointing to two of 
its unique advantages over competing tenure regimes.127 
The first advantage relates to the continued legitimacy of our federal 
court system. As Ward Farnsworth has noted, an important feature of life 
tenure is that it decelerates the rate of legal change.128 By definition, life 
tenure maximizes each judge’s time on the bench, which naturally tends to 
produce slower turnover of court personnel. Gradual change in the 
composition of the Supreme Court generally results in gradual changes in 
the law, as individual judges generally do not reverse course on issues they 
have already decided.129 Constitutional law in particular develops more 
cautiously and incrementally as a result.130  
 127. Before presenting an affirmative case for life tenure, we would be remiss if we failed to 
mention the powerful negative case for life tenure. Calabresi and Lindgren attempt to turn the long 
tradition of life tenure into a liability, complaining that it survives merely because of “inertia.” 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 97. It is a bizarre claim coming from self-described Burkean 
conservatives. Of course, inertia plays a role. Anyone who proposes to abolish a longstanding 
institution like life tenure, especially through the extraordinary means of a constitutional amendment, 
bears the burden of persuasion.  
 128. Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 412. 
 129. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
903, 952–53 (2005) (noting that Justices are more likely to reconsider precedents in which they did not 
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In contrast, term limits (or direct election of judges) would by design 
produce brisk legal change because both models aim for more rapid, 
regular turnover of judges in the name of democratic accountability.131 
Constitutional law would change more swiftly to reflect more rapid 
changes in the composition of the Court.132 The shorter the term, the 
sooner a new batch of Justices can correct the purported errors of the 
outgoing Court. In fact, the public may come to see reversals of precedent 
as the “spoils” of an electoral victory.133 The possibility that one political 
party will have the right to capture the Court in a relatively short period of 
time will create greater legal instability.134  
We do not mean to overstate the disparity. Life-tenured judges 
sometimes make sudden changes in the law, including some famous 
reversals of precedent.135 Likewise, term-limited state court judges have 
shown themselves perfectly capable of gradual legal change. The point is 
that, in the aggregate and over time, life tenure means slower legal change 
and less frequent overruling of precedents. Rhode Island and New 
Hampshire, two of the three states that grant their high court judges life 
tenure, illustrate this phenomenon.136 A study of ten state supreme courts 
between 1991 and 2000 showed that the Supreme Courts of Rhode Island 
participate, and that life tenure operates as a brake on reconsidering precedent); Eugene Volokh, A 
Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1488 (1999) (noting that 
“[c]hanges of mind . . . are of course possible,” but that they are “hard to justify to the public”). 
 130. Volokh, supra note 129, at 1488 (arguing that judges recognize that “[c]onstitutional text 
isn’t supposed to mean one thing this year and the opposite ten years later”). 
 131. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 48–49. 
 132. See Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 77–78 (2003).  
 133. See Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 437 (arguing that if each President were guaranteed two 
appointments to the Supreme Court, there would be a perception that “[h]e earned them” and was 
therefore entitled to the resulting legal change). 
 134. See id. at 415–16. For instance, under Calabresi and Lindgren’s proposal, a party would have 
the right to “capture” a majority of the Court any time it won three consecutive presidential elections, 
as the Democrats did during the Roosevelt administration and the Republicans did during the Reagan 
and Bush administrations. Our concern is that a system designed to facilitate swift capture and 
recapture by shifting political majorities would lead to erratic changes in the law. 
 135. The most celebrated example is Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which overruled 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The most pilloried example is the Court’s flip-flopping in the 
area of state immunity, beginning with Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which was overruled 
in Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and then vindicated when Usery was 
overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Chief Justice Rehnquist 
in 1991 documented thirty-three reversals of precedent over the twenty preceding terms of the Court. 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 828, 830 n.1 (1991). Although a few reversals came after only three or 
five years, see Ranae Bartlett, Case Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REV. 561, 574 (1992), on average more than forty 
years passed between an original decision and its reversal. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 n.1. 
 136. Joseph J. Darby, Guarantees and Limits of the Independence and Impartiality of the Judge, 
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 1006 (2004) (noting that the third such state is Massachusetts). 
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and New Hampshire overruled themselves only two times and six times, 
respectively, during the decade, fewer than any of the other states in the 
study and in sharp contrast with the 109 reversals in Montana.137 
The choice between fast or slow legal change implicates the legitimacy 
of the courts, echoing the most common justifications for stare decisis.138 
Swift legal change and the rapid-fire reversal of controlling precedent 
undermine the Court’s legitimacy by creating the appearance that its 
decisions turn on nothing more than the personnel on the Court.139 Slow 
legal change and reluctance to overrule precedent promote the institutional 
credibility of the judiciary by demonstrating that judges decide cases 
fairly, consistently, and impartially.140  
A second advantage of life tenure relates to judicial independence. The 
most widely cited virtues of life tenure, articulated by Alexander Hamilton 
in The Federalist No. 78, include its power to shield judges from 
interference by the political branches and the people, leaving them free to 
fairly and correctly interpret the counter-majoritarian Constitution.141 Life 
tenure promotes independence in several ways. First, it prevents the 
political branches from retaliating against judges for unpopular decisions 
by removing them from office.142 Second, it removes incentives to curry 
favor with the political branches in an effort to win reappointment.143 
Third, it means that federal judges “have reached the end of their official 
careers,”144 rendering them unconcerned about angling for future political 
appointment.145 
 137. Jeffrey T. Renz, Stare Decisis in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REV. 41, 54 fig.2 (2004). Measured 
on a per-filing basis, Rhode Island reversed itself in only 0.46 cases and New Hampshire in 0.73 cases 
per 1,000 filings, again the lowest rates of reversal in the study, compared with 17.8 reversals per 
1,000 filings in Montana. Id. at 57 tbl.2. 
 138. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (calling predictability 
the “mainstay” of stare decisis, but also citing judicial economy and “public faith in the judiciary”). It 
is possible to support life tenure on these grounds and yet oppose stare decisis. While both regimes 
protect stability, they pose different trade-offs. Stare decisis promotes stability at the expense of 
correctness, while life tenure promotes stability at the expense of some majoritarian influences. 
 139. See Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 493 (2003). 
 140. See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: 
Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 54 
(describing stare decisis as “a public relations tool useful in protecting the Court as a political 
institution, rather than a jurisprudential doctrine designed to protect the Court’s precedent”).  
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 11; see also United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 
(2001) (stating that “life tenure” “helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the ‘complete 
independence of the courts of justice’”).  
 142. Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 362 (2005). 
 143. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The 
Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (1988). 
 144. Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the 
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One might disagree, of course, that the judiciary needs protection from 
the political branches,146 or that independence necessarily promotes 
fairness and constitutional fidelity.147 By and large, however, supporters of 
term limits believe in these basic goals of life tenure.148 They argue instead 
that fixed, nonrenewable terms would just as effectively safeguard judicial 
independence.149 After all, a fixed term prevents the political branches 
from removing a judge prematurely, and a nonrenewable term removes 
incentives related to reappointment.150 
Even fixed, nonrenewable terms, however, would introduce incentives 
for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a way that improves their 
prospects for future employment outside the judiciary.151 Longer terms, 
like the eighteen years proposed by Calabresi and Lindgren, would reduce 
the frequency, but not the potency, of those incentives. It is easy to 
imagine that a young Justice, such as Justice Thomas, who will be sixty-
one years old after serving eighteen years on the Court, could have a 
successful “second career” in politics.152 It is even easier to imagine that a 
“successor Justice,” who under most term limit plans would serve out the 
end of the term for a Justice who dies or resigns early,153 will be 
influenced by plans for post-Court employment. Life tenure on the 
Supreme Court will always offer one unique form of judicial 
independence: the option to spend one’s entire career on the Court.154 
Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 192 (2004). 
 145. Lower court judges may, of course, hope for a promotion within the federal judicial 
hierarchy, but Supreme Court Justices have gone about as far as they can go. 
 146. See Prakash, supra note 3, at 575. 
 147. See Jack N. Rakove, Once More into the Judicial Breach, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 381, 385 
(2003) (arguing that “Article III offers powerful incentives to exploit life tenure, not in the interest of 
promoting judicial impartiality, but for exactly opposite purposes”). 
 148. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 67; L.A. Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go: Leaving 
the Bench, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1227, 1235 (2000). 
 149. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1202, 1211 (1988). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Oliver, supra note 3, at 818 (noting the possibility that “Justices would alter their votes in 
order to smooth their way into post-Court professional or political careers”). 
 152. Calabresi and Lindgren express confidence that by automatically designating Supreme Court 
Justices to the lower courts when their term expires, their plan avoids this criticism. See Calabresi & 
Lindgren, supra note 3, at 55 n.132. We think they seriously overestimate the appeal that a demotion 
to the lower courts holds for judges who have already reached the pinnacle of their careers on the 
Supreme Court. Indeed, one of the reasons that Justices resist retirement today is that continued active 
service is far more attractive and prestigious than the office of Senior Justice, which already includes 
service on the lower federal courts. 
 153. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 53; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 3, at 1122 
n.108. 
 154. True, Supreme Court Justices today have the option of resigning their posts to accept political 
appointments, as Justice Goldberg did when he resigned to become Ambassador to the United Nations. 
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B. Responses to Criticisms of Life Tenure 
A voluminous and thoughtful literature has developed criticizing life 
tenure,155 while surprisingly few scholars have rushed to its defense.156 We 
do not attempt to address every argument here.157 Instead, we focus on the 
three criticisms we find most credible: (1) that an increase in the average 
length of terms has rendered the Supreme Court democratically 
unaccountable; (2) that life tenure allows Justices to engage in strategic 
retirement behavior to ensure a like-minded successor; and (3) that life 
tenure allows Justices who suffer from serious mental and physical 
infirmity to remain on the bench. The first two criticisms suffer from 
empirical and theoretical weaknesses, and if they represented the only 
disadvantages of life tenure, we would be inclined to leave the present 
system in place. The serious and ongoing problem of mental and physical 
infirmity, however, requires action. All three criticisms could be addressed 
by statutory incentives, like our proposed golden parachute, without 
amending the Constitution. 
1. Increased Term Length and Democratic Accountability 
The most potent criticism of life tenure is that the slow rate of turnover 
produces an unaccountable judiciary. The argument typically consists of 
two claims. First, the average term length for Supreme Court Justices has 
dramatically increased in the last thirty years, disrupting what had been the 
expectation of the Framers and a stable historical norm. Second, the 
increase is problematic because it impairs the ability of the political 
However, the possibility of voluntary, premature resignation exists in every tenure regime. Term limits 
add another pressure for young judges, who must either accept a demotion or find work elsewhere 
when their term ends. 
 155. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 3; Oliver, supra 
note 3; Prakash, supra note 3. 
 156. Two noteworthy defenses are Farnsworth, supra note 5, and William G. Ross, The Hazards 
of Proposals to Limit the Tenure of Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal Without 
Impeachment, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1063 (1990). 
 157. Specifically, we do not address arguments that life tenure causes the President to nominate 
candidates who are too young, that clustering in the distribution of vacancies deprives presidents of 
seats on the Court to which they are somehow entitled, or that life tenure is responsible for the 
politicization and contentiousness of the confirmation process. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 
3, 30–32, 61–62; DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 3, at 1110–19. For a response, see Farnsworth, 
supra note 5, at 424–30, 435–39 (younger nominees and clustering); Arthur D. Hellman, Reining in 
the Supreme Court: Are Term Limits the Answer?, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR THE 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 298–303, supra note 3 (politicization and contentiousness of confirmation).  
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branches, through the nomination and confirmation process, to assert a 
proper democratic check on the Court. 
The first claim is empirical, and a closer look at the data suggests that it 
depends more on the chosen period lengths than a bona fide trend. 
Calabresi and Lindgren document an increase in term length from an 
average of 12.2 years during 1941–1970 to an average of 26.1 years from 
1971–2000.158 Related statistics have since popped up in a number of 
editorials in the popular press.159 On its face, the figure reveals an 
“astonishing” and “dramatic” increase.160 
The problem is that this statistic is based on a period length (thirty 
years) and a cutoff date (1971) that exaggerates the trend. A number of 
Justices served unusually short terms in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s: 
Byrnes (1.3 years), Rutledge (6.6 years), Vinson (7.2 years), Minton (7.0 
years), Whittaker (5.0 years), Goldberg (2.8 years), and Fortas (3.8 
years).161 Average tenures actually were higher before 1940,162 so the 
trend looks more like a random walk than a steady climb. At the same 
time, drawing the cutoff date at 1971 ensures that the unusually long 
tenures of Justices Black (34.1 years) and Douglas (36.6 years) count as 
recent developments, even though both ended more than thirty years ago, 
when the authors claim the current trend began.163 
A decade-by-decade view of the same data belies both of their central 
claims. Average tenure today is neither “dramatically increasing” nor 
historically unprecedented: 
 158. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 24. 
 159. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, A Question of Justice, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 6, 2005, at 3; Fred 
Graham, In Need of Review: Life Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2006, at 
11A. 
 160. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 20, 23. 
 161. We derive all of our data from the invaluable Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal 
Judiciary, http://air.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Nov. 26, 2005). Like other authors, we count 
each term separately for the two Justices who served noncontinuous terms, Hughes and Rutledge. All 
charts take into account the recent passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the January 31, 2006 
retirement of Justice O’Connor. 
 162. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 23 chart 1. 
 163. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 24 (alleging that “the average age at which justices 
have left office has increased remarkably throughout history, and most sharply in the past thirty-five 
years”).  
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Although the average length of tenure did dramatically increase in the 
1970s, it actually dipped to around eighteen years in the 1980s with the 
departures of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell. And 
even in the 1970s and 1990s, average tenure never eclipsed the 29.3 year 
average tenure of retiring Justices in the 1830s.  
A fair criticism of both our chart and Calabresi and Lindgren’s is that 
too much turns on the arbitrariness of the selected periods. A year here or 
there, on one side or the other of a cutoff, and the average for the period 
might rise or fall considerably. Yet a rendering of the data that flattens 
those periods, taking judges in groups of five, likewise reveals no dramatic 
recent trend or unprecedented length of service:164 
 
 
 164. Justices in this chart are grouped in chronological order by date of commission, excluding 
those who remain in active service. The column labeled “5” represents the average tenure of the first 
five individuals commissioned to serve on the Court. The column labeled “10” represents the next five, 
etc. Because our data set includes 103 Justices, divided into groups of five, the final group includes 
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An even less convincing argument, closely related to the “dramatic 
recent increase” claim, is that the length of tenure today has disrupted the 
expectations of the founders. Calabresi and Lindgren argue that 
improvements in medicine and increases in average life expectancy have 
caused a fundamental change in “the real-world, practical meaning of life 
tenure,”165 producing a system that is “very different now from what it was 
in 1789.” When the Federalists and Anti-Federalists discussed their 
expectations, however, they contemplated even longer tenure on the courts 
than we have seen to date. Federal Farmer No. 15 complained that judges 
with life tenure would serve “thirty or forty years.”166 Meanwhile, 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 79 assailed New York’s mandatory 
retirement age of sixty for judges on the grounds that “[t]he deliberating 
and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond 
 
 
only the three most recently commissioned Justices to leave the bench, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor and Powell. 
 165. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 20. 
 166. FEDERAL FARMER NO. 15, supra note 33, at 101. 
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that period in men who survive it.”167 Moreover, the argument imputes to 
the Founders spectacular shortsightedness. They almost certainly knew 
then, as we know today, that life expectancy continues to increase over 
time. They chose life tenure anyway. 
Although we believe there has been no dramatic change since 1971, 
and that present average tenure falls within the expectations of the 
founders, we do not deny that the average length may increase over time 
due to advances in medical care. The last members of the Rehnquist Court, 
who served together longer than any contingent since the 1820s,168 could 
nudge average term lengths upward in the coming decades. Nonetheless, 
given the nation’s history of periods in which average tenure reached 
levels every bit as high as those that prevail today, we have not come close 
to a point of constitutional crisis. 
Their second claim is normative and it proceeds as follows. The 
lengthy terms associated with life tenure make the Supreme Court less 
democratically accountable169 because they hinder operation of the 
principal device through which the political branches exercise control over 
the judiciary: the appointment and confirmation process.170 Although 
judges enjoy independence once in office, the selection process for judges 
injects majoritarian values into the courts. Life tenure, therefore, creates a 
feckless judicial “aristocracy,” unresponsive to the preferences of the 
people.171 Term limits, on the other hand, would guarantee regular 
opportunities to make the courts more democratically accountable. 
Critics of life tenure, however, struggle to explain how “democratic 
accountability” means anything other than “popular results.”172 The 
problem with deriding unpopular decisions is that they may be correct. 
The Warren Court’s racial equality cases, including Brown v. Board of 
Education173 and Loving v. Virginia,174 encountered fierce resistance when 
 167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 11, at 474. 
 168. Mary Deibel, Court Jumps into Politics, CINCINNATI POST, July 1, 2004, at A5. 
 169. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 35–39. 
 170. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 171. Prakash, supra note 3, at 573. 
 172. As Ward Farnsworth has noted, the public does not hold strong preferences about judicial 
philosophy, but does hold strong preferences about the outcomes in some cases. See Farnsworth, supra 
note 5, at 423 (arguing that, to the extent the public cares about judicial candidates’ avowals of 
“interpretive theory,” such claims are used as “signaling device[s] to denote types of judges who will 
produce certain outcomes”). 
 173. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 174. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that state antimiscegenation statutes violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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decided.175 Of course, many unpopular decisions happen to be wrong as 
well, and greater democratic responsiveness might reverse them faster. 
The point is that, by imperiling all unpopular decisions, greater democratic 
accountability carries serious costs. 
Term limits, meanwhile, accomplish too little. Assuming a nine-
member Supreme Court, during a period when life tenure produced 
twenty-four-year average terms, a majority of the Court turns over 
approximately every 13.3 years (5/9 × 24).176 Under a system of fixed, 
nonrenewable eighteen-year terms, a majority of the Court will turn over 
every ten years (5/9 × 18).177 Fixed terms, in other words, would allow the 
political branches to recapture an utterly unaccountable court, on average, 
3.3 years or (almost) 25% faster. For such a dramatic change in the 
operation of the federal judiciary, the payoff is surprisingly modest. 
Moreover, as discussed above, quick turnover has costs for the 
legitimacy of courts.178 To be sure, a rapidly changing, democratically 
accountable Court could swiftly reverse unpopular decisions, even moving 
back and forth repeatedly, if needed, to accommodate fickle public 
preferences. But that behavior would, over time, undermine confidence in 
the courts as an impartial, independent branch of our republican 
government. Crucially, even under life tenure, the President and Senate 
exert a democratic check on the courts.179 As Professor Farnsworth has 
observed, life tenure produces “varying degrees of responsiveness in the 
Court depending on the ages at which the Justices are appointed,”180 but 
the initial appointment process ensures that Justices are never truly 
unaccountable. Assuming that accountability and legitimacy are both 
valuable, as even critics of life tenure seem to recognize,181 then average 
 175. Calvin Woodard, Listening to the Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1 (1994) 
(describing the “Southern Manifesto” by Southern congressmen who rejected the decision, 
“omnipresent” signs calling for Chief Justice Warren’s impeachment, and state “interposition” of the 
decision). 
 176. Again, theoretically, it could turn over faster or slower depending on the spacing of Justices’ 
starting and departure dates. 
 177. Theoretically, it could turn over faster if death, resignation, or impeachment resulted in a 
vacancy before the end of a Justice’s term. 
 178. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 179. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045, 1076 (2001) (“One might think of this as ‘counter-majoritarian,’ but in fact, it is not. It 
represents a temporally extended majority rather than a contemporaneous one.”). 
 180. Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 424. 
 181. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 39; Prakash, supra note 3, at 576 (expressing 
confidence that even with short terms and removal at will by Congress, federal judges would have the 
“sturdy backbones” necessary to act fairly and independently). 
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term length must be recognized as involving a tradeoff between those 
values. Each potentially comes at the expense of the other. 
Increased average length of tenure on the Court does not justify 
abandoning life tenure. The supposed recent increase in average length of 
tenure is belied by the data, and historically, today’s terms are neither 
unprecedented nor unexpected. Reducing the average length of tenure may 
produce more popular results, but at a cost to the legitimacy of the courts. 
2. Strategic Retirement 
A second criticism of life tenure is that judges engage in strategic 
retirement behavior to ensure a like-minded successor. History provides a 
few remarkable examples. Chief Justice Taft wrote in 1929 that, despite 
feeling “older and slower and less acute and more confused,” he felt the 
need to “stay on the court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting 
control.”182 Justice Douglas engaged in a transparent effort to prevent his 
personal political enemy Gerald Ford, who had once led a charge to 
impeach Douglas, from appointing his successor.183 The notion that 
strategic retirement behavior is pervasive on the Supreme Court has 
become, for many, an article of faith. 
Nonetheless, most empirical analyses have rejected the hypothesis that 
Justices retire for strategic reasons. A study conducted by Peverill Squire 
in 1988 found no statistically significant relationship between voluntary 
retirements and the unity of the party affiliations between a Supreme Court 
Justice and the President.184 Another study by Christopher Zorn and 
Steven Van Winkle in 2000 confirmed Squire’s finding.185 An analysis of 
retirements since 1937, conducted by Saul Brenner in 1999, coded Justices 
as “liberal” and “conservative” rather than relying on party affiliation, and 
concluded that “possibly two of the 33 justices (6.5%) who left the Court 
in the post-1937 era might have strategically retired.”186 
Most recently, in a 2005 study, Professor Albert Yoon found that 
federal judges in general, and Supreme Court Justices in particular, were 
 182. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Nov. 14, 1929), quoted in 2 HENRY F. 
PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 967 (1939). 
 183. WARD, supra note 5, at 186. 
 184. Peverill Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United States Supreme 
Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 180, 184, 185 tbl.1, 190 (1988). 
 185. Christopher J. W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme 
Court Vacancies 1789–1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145, 155 tbl.2, 157 (2000). 
 186. Saul Brenner, The Myth that Justices Strategically Retire, 36 SOC. SCI. J. 431, 436 (1999).  
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“largely unaffected by either political or institutional environment,”187 
including the political affiliation of the President.188 All three studies 
found that pension eligibility, on the other hand, played a significant role 
in retirement decisions.189 Only one empirical study, conducted by 
Timothy Hagle, has found evidence of strategic retirement.190 Hagle found 
that retirements were significantly more likely in four situations: (1) 
during a President’s second term, (2) during the earlier years of the second 
term, (3) when there was unity of party between the Senate and a majority 
of the Supreme Court but the majority in the Senate was decreasing, and 
(4) when Justices did not have prior political experience.191 
Important methodological differences separate the studies. Squire and 
Zorn and Van Winkle analyze each Justice’s decision to retire or not retire 
each year as a separate observation.192 Hagle has criticized this approach, 
noting that it creates a data set with a large disparity between voluntary 
retirements (fewer than fifty) and total observations (more than 1,650).193 
But Hagle’s approach suffers from far more serious problems. He analyzes 
only whether any Justice retired in a given year, and therefore necessarily 
ignores crucial individual factors194—most obviously the individual 
Justice’s political party or ideology, but also nonpolitical factors that 
demonstrably affect retirement decisions, like age, pension eligibility and 
health problems.195 As a result, his modeling of strategic behavior is 
crude,196 and he cannot rule out other conventional explanations as 
interfering variables when explaining his results.197 
 187. Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 
1969–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 6, on file with author). 
 188. See id. (manuscript at 37). 
 189. See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
 190. See Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United 
States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25, 36–37 (1993). 
 191. Id. at 36–38. 
 192. Squire, supra note 184, at 184; Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 185, at 150. 
 193. Hagle, supra note 190, at 27. 
 194. Yoon, supra note 187 (manuscript at 10). 
 195. Hagle defends this choice because “[f]rom the president’s point of view, it is of less concern 
whether any specific justice resigns than if any will before the next election.” Hagle, supra note 190, at 
30. But we are interested in the reasons why Justices retire, not in how such a retirement affects the 
President. 
 196. See infra note 210. 
 197. Hagle found that neither the mean age of the Court as a whole nor the proportion of the Court 
over eighty are significantly related to retirement. Those variables are clumsy substitutes for the age of 
a particular Justice, which is the relevant factor for our purposes. Hagle, supra note 190, at 35–36, 37 
tbl.1. He did not test pension eligibility or health problems, both of which Squire had found significant 
in 1988. Squire, supra note 184, at 185–86. 
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Still, the strategic retirement criticism has never been about the 
numbers. It has been about anecdotes. Sometimes the stories are 
inconsistent. Allegedly, Justice White delayed his retirement to benefit his 
party at the expense of his ideology,198 while Justice Blackmun delayed his 
retirement to advance his ideology at the expense of his party.199 
Sometimes the stories are implausible. One current theory is that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist strategically declined to retire in July 2005 because 
simultaneous vacancies would have allowed President Bush to nominate a 
“mixed slate—one more conservative, one less conservative,”200 and 
Rehnquist could not bear the thought of anything less than two resolute 
conservatives.201 
But mostly, the stories are resilient. For example, Justice O’Connor 
appeared to hand critics of life tenure a “smoking gun” in 2000. A front-
page story in the Wall Street Journal reported that when news stations 
predicted that Al Gore would win Florida in the 2000 election, Justice 
O’Connor privately denounced the result as “terrible,” with her husband 
explaining that although she had planned to retire, she would now have to 
wait four more years.202 Yet Gore lost the election, and O’Connor still 
waited almost five years to retire, in spite of widespread anticipation of the 
razor-thin margin in the 2004 election. Does this disprove the theory that 
her retirement was strategic? Of course not, reply the critics. Some say the 
“shadow of Bush v. Gore” made it suspicious for any member of the 5–4 
majority in that case to retire.203 Others say her delay was a conscious 
effort to make it appear that she was not retiring strategically.204 Get it? If 
a judge’s behavior looks strategic, it is strategic. If it looks nonstrategic, it 
is strategic obfuscation. 
We do not deny that strategic factors influence retirement decisions. 
Plainly they do, and even Chief Justice Rehnquist has publicly 
acknowledged that the President’s party affiliation affects some retirement 
 198. Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He’ll Step Down from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 1993, at A1 (reporting that there had been “rumors” that White wanted to retire “if a Democrat was 
elected President”). 
 199. DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 3, at 1104 & n.41. 
 200. Ron Fournier & Gina Holland, Rehnquist Announces He’s Not Retiring from Court, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2005, at A2. 
 201. See Doug Kmiec, Delay is Good, NAT’L REV., July 15, 2005, http://www.nationalreview. 
com/comment/kmiec200507150835.asp. 
 202. Jess Bravin et al., Supreme Interests: For Some Justices, the Bush-Gore Case Has a Personal 
Angle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at A1. 
 203. See Amar & Calabresi, supra note 3.  
 204. See DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 3, at 1105 n.44 (conjecturing that O’Connor was 
embarrassed that her remarks were widely circulated). 
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decisions.205 But strategic retirement is a chameleon claim. With so many 
variables in play—the President’s party, the Senate’s composition, high-
profile opinions, the likely outcome of the next election—one can always 
find some way to characterize a decision to retire (or not retire) as 
strategic. Meanwhile, every empirical study to test the strategic retirement 
claim with respect to the Supreme Court finds that other factors, especially 
pension eligibility, influence the timing of retirements far more.206 
Professor Yoon rightly warns against “the danger of making 
generalizations regarding judicial service from anecdotal evidence.”207 
Two other factors blunt the strategic retirement criticism. First, not all 
types of strategic retirement are equally problematic. The criticism begins 
from the assumption that there is a “right time” for every Justice to retire 
based on nonpolitical factors. Justices may retire before that time 
(“strategic early retirement”) or after that time (“strategic late 
retirement”).208 Strategic early retirement allows a Justice to extend his 
influence on the Court through another appointment. Although 
transparently strategic early retirement damages confidence in the 
Court,209 it is not “undemocratic,” because naming a replacement still falls 
to a duly elected President, and it can only occur when a like-minded 
President has won election long after the Justice was appointed.210 It may 
entrench a waning political or legal philosophy for another term, but as 
discussed above, gradual development of the law has its advantages as 
well as disadvantages.211  
 205. Interview by Charlie Rose with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, United States Supreme 
Court (PBS television broadcast Jan. 13, 1999), quoted in WARD, supra note 5, at 218. 
 206. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text. 
 207. Yoon, supra note 187 (manuscript at 42). 
 208. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 368 n.a (2d ed. 1996). 
 209. Earl Warren’s botched attempt to retire in time for Lyndon Johnson to appoint his successor 
was a spectacular embarrassment, widely denounced by the right and left. See DiTullio & Schochet, 
supra note 3, at 1101–02. 
 210. Notably, the Hagle study modeled only strategic early retirement, not strategic late 
retirement. It treated all retirements in a President’s second term as strategic retirements, on the theory 
that uncertainty about the next race, with no incumbent, would induce Justices to retire prematurely. 
See Hagle, supra note 190, at 32. It also treated all retirements early in a President’s second term as 
strategic, on the theory that Justices would retire prematurely to take advantage of the President’s 
postreelection political capital. Id. at 31–32. It treated retirements during years when the Senate saw a 
reduced majority and the majority of the Court (but not necessarily the retiring Justice!) shared that 
party’s political affiliation as strategic, on the theory that Justices would retire quickly, before the 
Senate majority evaporated. Id. at 32–33. Not only do these techniques run a high risk of reporting 
false positives because they ignore the retiring Justice’s political or ideological affiliation, they ignore 
strategic late retirement entirely. In contrast, the other studies measure such factors as bare political 
unity between a Justice and the President, which attempts to capture strategic late retirements as well.  
 211. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
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Strategic late retirement, on the other hand, may have grave 
consequences. Justices injure their own reputation and the reputation of 
the Court when they attempt to hold on to office while their mental and 
physical health deteriorates.212 The danger of strategic late retirement has 
nothing to do with whether it succeeds or fails.213 The danger is that it may 
exacerbate the serious problem of mental and physical infirmity. 
Second, alternatives to life tenure involve serious risks of strategic 
behavior as well. Term limits or a mandatory retirement age, for example, 
would create “final period problems”: Justices may change their behavior 
strategically during their final period on the Court (or the final period of 
their ideological allies) to extend their own influence or thwart their 
successors.214 If the claim is correct, then in a regime that limits retirement 
options, Justices presumably will find ways other than retirement to 
achieve their strategic objectives.215 Litigants too would have greater 
strategic options under a system of term limits or a mandatory retirement 
age. Interest groups would have a strong incentive to expedite or delay a 
strong test case, given absolute certainty that a “good” or “bad” Justice 
will soon be forced from the Court. 
Strategic factors influence the timing of retirements, but other factors 
play a far more important role. Most empirical research rejects the 
hypothesis that Justices retire for strategic reasons, and the claim rests 
instead on anecdotes so resilient and chameleon that they are impossible to 
disprove. The danger of strategic retirement lies mostly in its potential to 
worsen the problem of mental and physical infirmity on the Court. 
3. Mental and Physical Infirmity 
The third critique, and the least controversial, is that many Justices 
suffer from mental or physical infirmity216 but adamantly refuse to retire 
 212. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 213. See Ross, supra note 156, at 1086–87 (noting that strategic late retirement frequently fails, 
and the “wrong” President ends up naming a replacement anyway).  
 214. Hellman, supra note 157, at 298–303. Professor Hellman notes that retiring Justices will have 
an incentive to load the docket, ignoring justiciability and “vehicle” problems, in order to decide 
important cases before their tenure ends. Id. He also notes that advocacy groups, which play a crucial 
role in bringing cases before the Court, will have an incentive to time their actions strategically as a 
result of greater certainty about the composition of the Court. Id. at 306.  
 215. See, e.g., David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 10–12, on file with author) (describing the various ways that 
Justices act strategically). 
 216. When using the term “infirmity” in the text, we are talking about such an incapacitating 
condition that Justices are unable to perform their duties for an extended period of time. We therefore 
exclude physical disabilities, such as blindness or deafness, that do not prevent Justices from 
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for one reason or another. Professor David Garrow’s encyclopedic history 
of mental “decrepitude” on the Supreme Court reveals the breadth and 
depth of this problem.217 In the twentieth century, at least eleven members 
of the Supreme Court suffered a serious mental decline during their final 
years: Chief Justices Fuller and Taft and Justices McKenna, Holmes, 
Murphy, Minton, Whittaker, Black, Douglas, Powell, and Marshall.218 
Another four suffered incapacitating long-term physical disabilities: 
Justices Gray, Brewer, Moody, and Pitney.219 That group represents 29% 
of the 52 Justices who retired during the period.220 Their refusal to step 
down caused a whole host of embarrassments, some of which caused 
lasting damage to the reputation of the Court.221 Garrow blasts the “overly 
sanguine” conventional view that “no formal remedies need to be 
considered.”222 He is correct. A Justice’s mental and physical infirmity 
threatens both the performance and credibility of the Court. 
Yet Garrow’s proposed solution, a constitutional amendment creating a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy-five for federal judges,223 only 
indirectly addresses the problem. Age is not a perfect proxy for mental and 
physical infirmity, and thus a mandatory retirement age suffers from two 
drawbacks. First, it is underinclusive. Garrow acknowledges that four 
twentieth century Justices, more than a third of those who suffered mental 
infirmity, began their decline before reaching his proposed retirement age: 
Murphy (59), Minton (65), Whittaker (65), and Taft (72).224 The same 
goes for all four Justices who suffered incapacitating physical disability on 
the Court: Gray (74), Brewer (64), Moody (54), and Pitney (64).225 
Second, it is overinclusive. Many Justices serve beyond age seventy-five 
without suffering mental or physical decline.226 Indeed, in the last century, 
performing their duties. 
 217. Garrow, supra note 5. 
 218. Id. at 1012 (Fuller), 1017 (Taft), 1012–16 (McKenna), 1017–18 (Holmes), 1027–28 
(Murphy), 1043–45 (Minton), 1045–50 (Whittaker), 1050–52 (Black), 1052–56 (Douglas), 1069–70 
(Powell), 1072–80 (Marshall). 
 219. See WARD, supra note 5, at 99–100 (Gray), 102–03 (Brewer), 106 (Moody), 116 (Pitney). 
Justices Gray, Brewer, Moody, and Pitney each suffered serious maladies, requiring their colleagues to 
pick up the slack for them. Id. Indeed, Justices Moody and Pitney suffered such serious long-term 
physical difficulties that Congress passed special pension legislation to induce each of them to retire. 
Id. at 106, 116. 
 220. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 161. 
 221. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 222. Garrow, supra note 5, at 995. 
 223. Id. at 1085–86. 
 224. Id. at 1085. 
 225. See WARD, supra note 5, at 99–100, 102–03, 106, 116. 
 226. Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 
26–27 (2001); John Gruhl, The Impact of Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices, 81 JUDICATURE 66, 
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Garrow’s proposed age limit would have affected more than twice as 
many healthy Justices (thirteen) as unhealthy Justices (six), cutting short 
the careers of Chief Justices Warren and Burger as well as Justices Harlan, 
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Hughes, Frankfurter, 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Edward and Byron White.227 Plus, even when an 
age limit would have “worked” by ending a Justice’s career before 
infirmity set in, it sometimes would have worked too soon. Justice Holmes 
deteriorated seriously in his nineties, but he continued to serve in good 
mental and physical health for more than a decade after he reached age 
seventy-five.228 Term limits are even less helpful, as length of tenure is an 
even poorer proxy for disability.229 
C. A Few Words for the Skeptic  
Suppose that, as a critic of life tenure, you find all of this discussion 
unconvincing because you want to see greater accountability for the Court, 
fewer strategic retirements, and fewer mentally or physically infirm 
Justices continuing to serve. Our proposal to create a golden parachute for 
Supreme Court Justices is a significant step toward solving all of these 
problems.  
First, the most obvious effect of pension reform is to encourage 
Justices to retire earlier, which will reduce average term lengths and 
increase the frequency with which the political branches can hold the 
courts accountable through the appointment process. It also blunts 
incentives for strategic late retirement by forcing Justices to forego a 
substantial financial payoff if they wish to gamble on their ability to 
persevere until a new administration takes office. Better than any revised 
tenure regime, it also targets mental and physical infirmity by removing 
disincentives for the retirement of infirm Justices prior to pension 
qualification. 
Second, our proposal does not require a constitutional amendment. We 
emphasize this feature not only because it makes our proposal more 
69–70 (1997). 
 227. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 161.  
 228. Garrow, supra note 5, at 1017. 
 229. Fixed eighteen-year terms also would have cut short more than twice as many healthy careers 
(fourteen) as unhealthy careers (six) in the twentieth century. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 
161. Compared with a mandatory retirement age at seventy-five, term limits would have failed to 
prevent one more instance of mental infirmity on the Court, see Garrow, supra note 5, at 1069–71 
(discussing Justice Powell), but would have prevented one case of physical infirmity, see WARD, supra 
note 5, at 99–100 (discussing Justice Gray).  
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politically expedient, but also because constitutional change should take 
place only after Congress has exhausted all other options. Whatever your 
assessment of the overall problem, we hope that you give serious 
consideration to our solution.  
III. AN INCENTIVES APPROACH TO RETIREMENT 
Life tenure should be retained. If increased length of tenure and the 
threat of strategic retirement represented the only drawbacks to life tenure, 
we would recommend leaving the present system in place. But the serious 
problem of mental and physical infirmity demands reform. We therefore 
propose an analytical approach and a package of reforms designed with 
the dangers of mental and physical infirmity in mind. 
Accordingly, we move in an entirely different direction from other 
scholars by advocating an incentives approach to Supreme Court tenure. 
First, we argue that pension reform, by way of implementing a golden 
parachute, will encourage Justices to retire before or immediately after 
mental or physical infirmity sets in. Second, we propose that Congress, as 
well as the Supreme Court itself, take straightforward measures to make 
the office of Senior Justice a more attractive alternative.  
A. Pension Reform and the Golden Parachute 
The most surprising aspect of reformers’ singular focus on major 
structural changes like term limits or a mandatory retirement age is that, to 
date, Congress’s most powerful tool for influencing the retirement timing 
of Justices has been pension reform. We begin by examining the historical 
and empirical evidence indicating that an increase in the size of judicial 
pensions should induce a greater number of Justices to retire upon mental 
or physical infirmity.  
1. The History of Federal Judicial Pensions  
For about the first eighty years of this country’s history, the United 
States did not offer any type of pension benefits to Article III judges. 
Relatively low salaries for Supreme Court Justices coupled with the lack 
of retirement benefits contributed, at least in part, to Justices staying on 
the Court too long.230 Indeed, twenty of the twenty-four Justices who 
served between 1801 and 1868 died in office.231  
 230. For example, between 1819 and 1854, an Associate Justice earned $4500 per year and the 
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For example, Justice Baldwin was known to be mentally infirm within 
the first two years of his appointment to the Court in 1830.232 Despite 
missing the entire 1833 Term of Court while he was hospitalized for what 
was termed “incurable lunacy,”233 he “hung on to his seat for fourteen 
years until death in order to continue drawing his salary.”234 Richard 
Peters, the Court’s reporter, wrote about Baldwin: “[H]is mind [is] out of 
order . . . . He sits in his room for three or four hours in the dark—jumps 
up and runs down into the judges’ consultation room in his stocking feet, 
and remains in that condition while they are deliberating.”235 Financial 
considerations also played a role in Justice Cushing’s decision to stay on 
the Court despite his mental decline.236  
In response to this problem, Congress passed retirement legislation in 
1869 that provided Article III judges with a yearly pension benefit equal to 
their annual salary at the time of retirement, so long as they had reached 
the age of seventy and served at least ten years.237 The results of the 
legislation could only be described as mixed, with some Justices retiring 
shortly after eligibility and others holding on too long. Passage of the 1869 
Act produced a greater balance between the number of Justices who died 
in office (nineteen) and those that retired (seventeen) in the period from 
1869–1936.238 
Initially, the 1869 Act seemed to have its intended effect, as Justices 
Grier and Nelson, both of whom could no longer carry their share of the 
Court’s workload, took advantage of the pension benefits shortly after the 
law was enacted.239 In fact, passage of the Act started a trend of four 
Chief Justice $5000 per year, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 208, at 42. Converting this salary to 1994 
dollars, an Associate Justice would earn from $36,646 in 1819 to $67,429 during the period from 
1849–1853. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 385–86 (1996). 
 231. See WARD, supra note 5, at 3–41. 
 232. Id. at 51. 
 233. Garrow, supra note 5, at 1002. 
 234. WARD, supra note 5, at 51; see also Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208, 211 (Fed. Cl. 
1948) (noting that judges had stayed on the bench after becoming mentally or physically disabled “to 
draw the salary of the office as long as they lived.”). 
 235. Letter from Richard Peters, Jr. to J. Hopkinson (Mar. 18, 1838), in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815–1935, at 302 (abr. ed. 1991). 
 236. WARD, supra note 5, at 60; see also Garrow, supra note 5, at 1001 (stating that Justice 
Cushing’s “mental facilities” had waned to the point where he was deranged, but that financial 
considerations had kept him on the bench). 
 237. Judiciary Act of 1869 § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45. Technically, a judge had to resign to receive 
pension benefits under the 1869 Act, but for consistency throughout this Article we will refer to the 
decision to step down with pension benefits as retirement. 
 238. See WARD, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 239. See id. at 4 tbl.1.1, 74 tbl.4.2, 78–79. 
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straight pension-eligible Justices opting for retirement.240 In addition, 
Justices Grier, Strong, Shiras, and Brown all opted for retirement within 
one year of pension eligibility.241  
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the tide had turned and 
more Justices were opting to stay on the bench rather than retire.242 Most 
notably, Justice Field stayed despite the fact that Chief Justice Fuller 
refused to assign any opinions to him during his last years on the Court.243 
During those final years, Justice Field purportedly asked questions during 
oral argument that demonstrated he no longer had a grasp on the issues 
presented, and it was reported that he could not remember how he had 
voted in conference.244 Justice Field finally retired in 1897, long after his 
health had declined and he was no longer able to contribute to the Court’s 
work.245 Others during this period, including Justices Clifford, Gray, and 
Brewer, stayed on the Court for a considerable amount of time after they 
had become physically or mentally disabled.246  
In 1919, Congress passed a law that allowed lower court judges to 
retire from active service and take on senior status.247 Under the law, 
judges would have the option of either fully retiring from the judiciary or 
continuing to hear and decide cases on a reduced basis as a senior judge.248 
In either case, the President would be entitled to nominate a successor for 
the vacant judgeship.249  
Then, largely in response to President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan 
and the limited effectiveness of the 1869 Act, Congress extended the 
option of senior status to Supreme Court Justices in 1937.250 The law 
guaranteed that, under either senior status or full retirement, a judge would 
continue to receive a pension equivalent to the full salary of an active 
 240. See id. at 74 tbl.4.2. 
 241. Id. at 73. 
 242. See id. at 4 tbl.1.1. 
 243. Garrow, supra note 5, at 1009. 
 244. CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 442 (1930); WARD, 
supra note 5, at 97. 
 245. See WARD, supra note 5, at 98. 
 246. Id. at 83–85, 99–100, 102–03.  
 247. Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29 § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157. Retired judges were not officially 
called “senior judges” until 1958. Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 5, 72 Stat. 848, 849. 
For consistency, we will refer to all retired judges that elect to continue to hear cases as “senior 
judges.” 
 248. Section 6, 40 Stat. at 1157. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24, 24; see also WARD, supra note 5, at 136–37 
(describing the political environment for passage of the 1939 Act). 
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judge.251 In 1948, Congress passed yet another law that permitted senior 
judges, including former Supreme Court Justices, to participate in any 
salary increases offered to their active counterparts.252 
The 1937 Act was more effective in inducing retirements than the 1869 
Act. Just three months after the 1937 Act was passed, Justice Van 
Devanter elected to take senior status.253 Less than a year later, Justice 
Sutherland departed as well.254 The notes of Chief Justice Hughes suggest 
that passage of the 1937 Act was a motivating factor in the retirements of 
both Justices.255 During the period from 1937 to 1945, five of the nine 
Justices who left the Court retired under the terms of the 1937 Act.256  
All five Justices who left the Court during the nine years following 
1945, however, died during their tenures in office.257 One of the five, 
Justice Murphy, was mentally infirm but was ineligible under the 1937 
Act because he had not yet served ten years.258 According to at least one 
account, Justice Murphy was afflicted with sciatic neuralgia and shingles, 
but was compelled to stay because he had little money beyond his annual 
salary.259 Justice Murphy himself indicated he would have retired had he 
been eligible for full pension benefits, stating in a letter to his brother that 
“the public servant should be allowed to retire without reference to 
disability or age.”260 The other four Justices all died quite suddenly and did 
not linger on the Court while their mental capacities deteriorated.261  
Congress passed another important measure in the wake of President 
Roosevelt’s failed attempt to pack the Court. In 1939, Congress enacted a 
law providing benefits to Article III judges who failed to meet the age and 
service requirements for retirement under the 1937 Act but nonetheless 
could not continue to carry out the duties of their office.262 Under the 1939 
 251. 40 Stat. at 1157.  
 252. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 903. 
 253. DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH 104–05 (1999); see THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
NOTES OF CHARLES EVAN HUGHES 303 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin, eds. 1973) 
[hereinafter HUGHES NOTES]. 
 254. WARD, supra note 5, at 138. 
 255. HUGHES NOTES, supra note 253, at 303. 
 256. WARD, supra note 5, at 131 tbl.6.2. 
 257. Id. 
 258. WARD, supra note 5, at 148. 
 259. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 458 (1968); 
see also Garrow, supra note 5, at 1085 (stating that Justice Murphy suffered from a condition that 
“should have precluded [his] ongoing service”). 
 260. Letter from Frank Murphy to George Murphy (Feb. 10, 1949), quoted in HOWARD, supra 
note 259, at 458. 
 261. WARD, supra note 5, at 146–50; see also ATKINSON, supra note 253, at 116–17, 120–22. 
 262. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433 § 3, 53 Stat. 1204, 1205. In 1957, Congress passed a law 
permitting an additional judge to be appointed when a majority of the circuit judicial council certifies 
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Act, permanently disabled judges were entitled to retire with full pay, 
regardless of age, if they had served more than ten years in the federal 
judiciary.263 Those judges who failed to meet the ten-year service 
requirement could retire on half pay.264 Justice Whittaker, who suffered a 
nervous breakdown while serving on the Court, was the first and only 
Justice to retire under the 1939 disability legislation.265  
The 1939 disability statute remedied the often inconsistent treatment of 
permanently disabled Justices over the course of the nation’s history. For 
example, Congress passed a law in 1882 that allowed Justice Hunt, who 
had been unable to serve at all for three years,266 to retire with full benefits 
even though he failed to meet the eligibility requirements under the 1869 
Act.267 Congress also passed special retirement legislation for Justices 
Pitney and Moody in 1910 and 1922, respectively,268 both of whom were 
apparently holding out for retirement benefits.269 
Other Justices, such as Benjamin Cardozo, were not so lucky. Three 
years into his tenure, Justice Cardozo suffered a heart attack, and one 
visitor to the Court observed that Justice Cardozo “struggled to read an 
opinion from the bench.”270 During the course of his service, he suffered 
two more heart attacks, contracted shingles, and suffered a debilitating 
stroke.271 An important factor in Justice Cardozo’s decision to stay on the 
Court was that he was not yet entitled to full retirement benefits after 
completing only six years of service.272 Indeed, Justice Cardozo’s decline 
was the catalyst for the 1939 disability legislation.273  
the disability. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-261, 71 Stat. 586. Only six judges have been 
involuntarily certified as “disabled” under this law. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of 
Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 275 (1993).  
 263. Section 3, 53 Stat. at 1205. 
 264. Id. 
 265. A number of federal circuit and district court judges have retired based upon disability since 
1939. See ATKINSON, supra note 253, at 130. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDGES TAKING 
DISABILITY RETIREMENT, 1939 TO PRESENT, 1–3 (2005) (on file with author). 
 266. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Cost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in 
Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1051, 1163 n.530 (2000). 
 267. Act of Jan. 27, 1882, ch. 4, 22 Stat. 2, 2. 
 268. Act of Dec. 11, 1922, ch. 1, 42 Stat. 1063, 1063 (regarding Mahlon Pitney); Act of June 23, 
1910, Priv. L. No. 61-129, 36 Stat. 1861, 1861 (regarding William Moody). 
 269. WARD, supra note 5, at 106, 116. 
 270. Id. at 139. 
 271. ATKINSON, supra note 253, at 107; WARD, supra note 5, at 139–40. 
 272. WARD, supra note 5, at 140. 
 273. Id. 
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In 1954, Congress expanded “senior status” to cover judges who were 
sixty-five years of age and had accumulated fifteen years of service.274 
Twenty-eight years later, Congress once again eased the eligibility 
requirements for retirement by adopting the “rule of eighty,” which allows 
federal judges to take senior status or retire on a sliding scale of age or 
service, beginning at age sixty-five and fifteen years of service, and ending 
at age seventy with ten years of service.275 The rule of eighty remains in 
force today.276 
As with the other retirement legislation, the effects of the 1954 Act 
were observed almost immediately. The first Justice to retire, Justice 
Minton, retired the very month that he accumulated his fifteenth year of 
service.277 The evidence surrounding his departure suggests that Justice 
Minton would have retired earlier if he had been eligible for benefits, as 
his health had been “precarious” for some time.278 His retirement started 
an astonishing trend of nineteen Supreme Court Justices who retired or 
resigned rather than dying in office.279  
As Professor David Garrow has documented, however, Justices Black, 
Douglas, Powell, and Marshall retired after they had become mentally 
infirm on the job.280 For instance, Justice Douglas’s mental condition was 
so grim that his colleagues voted seven to one to preclude him from 
writing any opinions and decided to hold over all cases where the Court’s 
decision hinged on Douglas’s vote.281 Likewise, Justice Marshall dozed off 
 274. Act of Feb. 10, 1954, ch. 6 § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371 
(2000)). In 1956, Congress enacted a voluntary survivor’s annuity program—which allows federal 
judges to contribute a small percentage of their salary with an additional contribution from the United 
States Treasury—that pays an annuity to the surviving spouse and/or children of a federal judge. Act 
of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 944 § 2, 70 Stat. 1021, 1021 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 376 (2000)). 
 275. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 204(a), 
98 Stat. 333, 350 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)); see Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and 
Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789–1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
333, 398 (1993).  
 276. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). Congress also introduced a certification process for senior judges in 
1989, requiring them to meet minimum workload requirements. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-194, § 705(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1770. 
 277. See Garrow, supra note 5, at 1043–44. 
 278. WARD, supra note 5, at 161. By the time he retired, Justice Minton had long suffered from 
pernicious anemia, spinal cord damage, and circulatory problems in his legs. Minton likely stayed on 
the Court for the start of the new Term in the fall of 1956 in order to collect his full retirement 
benefits. Id. at 162.  
 279. Id. at 159 tbl.7.5. 
 280. Garrow, supra note 5, at 1085.  
 281. Id. at 1054. 
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during some oral arguments, and it was reported that he spent much of his 
day in chambers watching daytime television.282 
Professor Garrow’s account makes the powerful point that mental 
infirmity remains an ongoing problem with respect to Supreme Court 
Justices. We wholeheartedly agree. In evaluating the problem, however, 
Garrow appears more concerned with the number of Justices that are 
mentally infirm rather than the length of incapacitation. He also ignores 
harms associated with physical incapacity, which can also be devastating 
for the Court. Moreover, the amount of time that incapacitated Justices 
stayed on the Court during the nineteenth century while incapacitated was 
staggering.283  
Pension reform, as an historical matter, has been remarkably effective 
at enticing some Justices to leave once they become mentally or physically 
infirm. It also has encouraged others, such as Justice Potter Stewart, to 
leave while relatively young and healthy.284 Nonetheless, the fact that 
infirm Justices continue to serve on our nation’s highest court means that 
there is still work to do.  
2. The Empirical Support for Pension Reform 
The historical evidence suggests that pension reform has affected the 
retirement behavior of many Supreme Court Justices. Most legal scholars, 
however, have limited their research almost exclusively to such evidence, 
ignoring the rich social science literature that points to an alternative 
approach. Empirical studies in disciplines such as economics and political 
science consistently have demonstrated that pensions represent one of the 
most significant factors in shaping retirement behavior.  
We begin by examining the vast empirical research on the factors that 
influence retirement decisions of the general population. We then turn our 
attention to the empirical studies that focus on the retirement decisions of 
Supreme Court Justices. Finally, we discuss the factors influencing the 
retirement decisions of two comparable actors: members of Congress and 
 282. Id. at 1071–72. Given the quality of some arguments before the Court, one might be tempted 
to forgive the Justices for taking a quick nap. But if sleeping through proceedings amounts to (almost) 
per se ineffective assistance of counsel, see Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc), we ought to expect more of Justices on the Supreme Court. 
 283. For instance, Justice Todd missed five of the eighteen terms he served, Justices Clifford and 
Grier missed seven or eight of their twenty three terms, and Justice Swayne missed at least a decade of 
his eighteen-year tenure. See Gruhl, supra note 226, at 68.  
 284. See WARD, supra note 5, at 193. 
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tenured faculty members at colleges and universities around the United 
States.  
a. General Trends in Empirical Pension Research 
For sixty years, labor economists have studied how different types of 
pension systems affect retirement behavior.285 As research during the 
1970s demonstrated, “retirement (and early retirement) rates rose 
dramatically as the Social Security and pension systems expanded. 
Noticeable changes in participation rates occur at ages important in 
pension and Social Security rules—60, 62, and 65.”286 One study 
published in 1977 found that, for one sample, combined Social Security 
and pension eligibility reduced the probability of labor force participation 
by 26%, and that among those with relatively poor health, the correlation 
between eligibility for either Social Security or a pension and the 
probability of labor force participation was stronger than for those in good 
health.287 Further, other early studies indicated that the amount of pension 
wealth was a key determinant of retirement.288 Accordingly, economists 
have long viewed retirement income rights as an “asset or stock of wealth” 
that potential retirees consider before making the retirement decision.289 
More recent econometric research has benefited from dynamic 
modeling that better isolates the individual effects of variables.290 For 
instance, a 1984 study found that incremental changes in retirement wealth 
can lead to significant changes in the date of retirement.291 Another study 
 285. See JOSEPH F. QUINN ET AL., PASSING THE TORCH: THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVES ON WORK AND RETIREMENT 43–53 (1990) (describing the early research dealing with 
Social Security and retirement). 
 286. Id. at 62; see also David A. Wise, Retirement Against the Demographic Trend: More Older 
People Living Longer, Working Less, and Saving Less, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 83, 87 (1997) (recognizing 
the increases in retirement rates at the key ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65). 
 287. See QUINN, supra note 285, at 64–66 (explaining Joseph F. Quinn, Microeconomic 
Determinants of Early Retirement: A Cross-Sectional View of White Married Men, 12 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 329, 338, 342 (1977)); see also Wise, supra note 286, at 94 (“Health status is . . . an 
important determinant of retirement, and the effect of health status may interact with the effect of 
pension plan provisions.”). 
 288. QUINN, supra note 285, at 68–70 (discussing Richard V. Burkhauser, The Pension 
Acceptance Decision of Older Workers 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 63, 73–74 (1979) and Richard V. 
Burkhauser, The Early Acceptance of Social Security: An Asset Maximization Approach, 33 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 484, 492 (1980)).  
 289. Id. at 70. 
 290. See id. at 79. 
 291. Id. at 100 (describing the findings in Gary S. Fields & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Effects of 
Social Security Reforms on Retirement Ages and Retirement Incomes, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 143, 158–59 
(1984)). 
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of an unanticipated early-retirement window offered by a Fortune 500 
company demonstrated that providing a bonus payment of three-to-twelve 
months salary could as much as double retirement rates.292 Finally, another 
important study conducted in 1983 found that potential retirees act 
rationally in approaching retirement, taking into account changes in total 
retirement wealth from another year of working in addition to the total 
discounted value of the entire stream of pension payments.293 There is, to 
be sure, some disagreement in the literature about the extent to which 
different pension plans influence retirement, but there seems to be near 
unanimity that they influence the average worker’s decision to retire.294  
b. Empirical Studies on the Retirement of Supreme Court Justices 
The general pension research discussed above explores only the 
retirement decisions of the average worker. Of course, Supreme Court 
Justices are far from average. As a group, they tend to be better educated, 
more wealthy, and in a job of much higher prestige and power than the 
average American. In addition, Supreme Court Justices differ from many 
Americans in that they enjoy life tenure. Thus, it may come as a surprise 
that recent studies have demonstrated that Supreme Court Justices 
affirmatively respond to financial incentives to retire.  
The first statistical study analyzing the retirement decisions of Supreme 
Court Justices was conducted in 1988 by Professor Peverill Squire.295 
Using each year a Justice served as a separate unit of analysis, Professor 
Squire tested nine independent variables, including age, infirmity,296 and 
pension eligibility, against the dependent variable of the retirement 
 292. Robin L. Lumsdaine et al., Efficient Windows and Labor Force Reduction, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 
131, 156 (1990). 
 293. Richard V. Burkhauser & Joseph F. Quinn, Is Mandatory Retirement Overrated? Evidence 
from the 1970s, 18 J. HUM. RESOURCES 337, 347 (1983). 
 294. See, e.g., Patricia M. Anderson et al., Trends in Male Labor Force Participation and 
Retirement: Some Evidence on the Role of Pensions and Social Security in the 1970s and 1980s, 17 J. 
LAB. ECON. 757, 778 (1999); Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A 
Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 417, 432 (1994) (arguing that some studies 
show smaller, but statistically significant, correlations between generous pensions and retirement 
decisions).  
 295. Squire, supra note 184. Professor Squire employed event-history analysis to explain 
retirements from 1789 to 1980. Event-history analysis uses longitudinal data to study the causes of 
retirements, crimes, death, and other “people” events. See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT 
HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984) (explaining event history 
analysis). 
 296. Professor Squire defined “infirmity” as “major physical disability,” not “failing health or 
mental incapacity.” Squire, supra note 184, at 186. 
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decision.297 He found that the two most important variables affecting a 
Justice’s decision to retire are infirmity and pension eligibility.298 
According to Squire, “the provision of judicial pensions and their 
subsequent improvement [have made] Supreme Court justices . . . more 
likely to voluntarily retire from the bench.”299  
A second, more comprehensive study was performed by Professors 
Christopher Zorn and Stephen Van Winkle.300 Also using regression 
analysis,301 the authors determined the relationship of a number of 
variables, including age and pension eligibility, to retirement and death.302 
Their model demonstrated that the single greatest factor influencing the 
retirement decision of Supreme Court Justices is pension eligibility.303 
Pension eligibility “has a strong, significant, positive effect on the 
retirement hazard.”304 Holding all the other variables at their means, 
pension eligibility increased the baseline hazard of retirement by an 
astounding 393%.305 
Professor Albert Yoon recently performed a third study, concluding 
that “[a]cross all levels of court, the best predictor of judicial vacancy is 
pension qualification,”306 although he also found that the effect of pension 
eligibility is somewhat weaker for Supreme Court Justices than for lower 
court judges.307 Unlike the other studies, Professor Yoon’s analysis 
differentiated between retirements that occurred during the year of pension 
qualification and those that occurred during the years following 
 297. Id. at 185 tbl.1. 
 298. See id.  
 299. Id. at 187. It bears noting that an article by Professor Timothy Hagle criticizes the 
methodology of the Squire study. The bulk of Professor Hagle’s criticism, however, is directed toward 
Squire’s approach in assessing the relationship between political factors and retirement, not the 
relationship between pension eligibility and retirement. In fact, if anything, Professor Hagle’s criticism 
demonstrates that the Squire study underestimated the influence of the pension variable. See Hagle, 
supra note 190, at 27.  
 300. Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 185. 
 301. Zorn and Van Winkle used an independent competing risks model. Id. at 153–54. In this 
model, the hazard associated with each of the risks—retirement and death in this case—“is assumed to 
be independent from that of the other risks, conditional on the effects of the independent variables.” Id. 
at 154. 
 302. Id. at 155 tbl.2. Unlike the Squire study, Zorn and Van Winkle did not include infirmity in 
their analysis. See id. 
 303. See id.  
 304. Id. at 154. 
 305. Id. at 155. The influence of pension eligibility on the retirement hazard is expressed as a 
percentage, meaning that pension eligibility increases the baseline hazard of retirement by 
approximately five times. See id. at 163 n.13. 
 306. Yoon, supra note 187 (manuscript at 40). 
 307. See id. (manuscript at 39 tbl.7). 
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eligibility.308 According to Professor Yoon, Supreme Court Justices are 
less likely than circuit and district court judges to retire during the year of 
pension qualification.309  
Perhaps Yoon’s findings with respect to Supreme Court Justices 
indicate that the financial payout from retirement is not large enough to 
overcome the other accoutrements of the office—power, prestige, and the 
utility derived from judging. Indeed, Professor Yoon does not rule out the 
possibility that a sufficiently large pension might induce different 
retirement behavior.310 Moreover, the explanatory power of pension 
qualification in the first year is not the issue. The key policy objective is to 
induce retirement when a Justice becomes mentally or physically infirm, 
which historically has seldom occurred during the first year of pension 
eligibility.311  
These empirical outcomes should not be surprising. Judge Richard 
Posner wrote in 1993 that judges and Justices are rational maximizers of 
their own utility function, which includes pecuniary income from salary 
and retirement benefits.312 As Professor Yoon has further argued, “judges 
appear to recognize—at least implicitly—the judicial compensation 
structure and how best to maximize it.”313  
c. Empirical Studies on Comparable Actors  
If there is a weakness in the existing empirical research on Supreme 
Court retirement behavior, it is that these studies necessarily can examine 
only a small number of observations, spread out over more than 200 
years.314 Accordingly, we think it is useful to examine other comparable 
actors, such as legislators and tenured faculty members, to determine 
whether financial incentives to retire have been successful in similar 
circumstances. 
 308. See id.  
 309. Id. (manuscript at 27). 
 310. See E-mail from Albert Yoon, Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School 
of Law, to David Stras, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (Apr. 12, 
2005, 21:28 CST) (on file with author). 
 311. Professor Yoon’s data do show a spike in retirements following the pension eligibility of 
Supreme Court Justices, just not as considerable as that of lower court judges. Yoon, supra note 187 
(manuscript at 27, 29 fig.6).  
 312. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 31 (1993).  
 313. Yoon, supra note 187 (manuscript at 43). 
 314. For example, the Zorn and Van Winkle study examines fifty-one retirements and forty-seven 
deaths. See Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 185, at 151 tbl.1. 
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First, a useful comparison is to the retirement behavior of members of 
Congress. Like Justices, Senators and Representatives tend to be highly 
educated and more affluent than the average American. In addition, they 
hold positions of great power and prestige, although perhaps not to the 
same degree as Supreme Court Justices.  
At least four studies have analyzed the atypical Congressional elections 
of 1992,315 which involved such anomalies as the scandal involving 
overdrafts on the House bank, extensive redistricting, and, most 
importantly, substantial financial incentives to retire.316 Thirty-three 
Representatives who were eligible to convert leftover campaign funds to 
personal use retired in 1992, the last year in which such funds could be 
kept by members of Congress.317 This golden parachute was worth a 
collective $8.6 million to the retiring members.318 
A study by Professors Groseclose and Krehbiel examined the impact of 
the golden parachute on the retirement of House members before the 1992 
election.319 Accounting for other factors such as the House Bank scandal 
and redistricting, the authors found that “golden parachutes alone 
accounted for a striking net increase of approximately . . . 19 
retirements—more than one-third of the total number of retirements.”320 
“[B]y a substantial margin, golden parachutes were the main cause of 
retirements,” causing “nearly twice as many retirements as redistricting 
and nearly four times as many retirements as the House Bank scandal.”321  
 315. See Sunil Ahuja et al., Modern Congressional Election Theory Meets the 1992 House 
Elections, 47 POL. RES. Q. 909 (1994); Harold D. Clarke et al., More Time with My Money: Leaving 
the House and Going Home in 1992 and 1994, 52 POL. RES. Q. 67 (1999); Timothy Groseclose & 
Keith Krehbiel, Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House, 
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75 (1994); Richard L. Hall & Robert P. Van Houweling, Avarice and Ambition in 
Congress: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
121 (1995). 
 316. See Groseclose & Krehbiel, supra note 315, at 77. 
 317. Martin Tolchin, 33 Retirees in House Are Eligible for $8.6 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
1992, § 1, at 22. Representatives that were eligible to convert their campaign funds to personal use 
were called “grandfathers” or “grandfathered members.” The 1979 Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments, the law at issue, mandated that only members serving prior to 1980 could take 
advantage of this golden parachute. Groseclose & Krehbiel, supra note 315, at 77, 84. 
 318. Tolchin, supra note 317. 
 319. Groseclose & Krehbiel, supra note 315, at 84.  
 320. Id. at 91. 
 321. Id. at 94–95. Another study conducted the same year found that the average member who had 
$100,000 or more available to convert to personal use was thirteen percent more likely to retire than a 
member with no golden parachute. See Ahuja et al., supra note 315, at 914–15. Yet another paper 
stated that having access to the maximum amount of convertible cash made an average Republican 
member three times as likely to retire in 1992. See Clarke et al., supra note 315, at 77. 
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A second article, published in 1995, reexamined the 1992 election, 
looking also at increases in expected long-term pension income that 
resulted from a 1989 wage increase for House members.322 Because 
pension benefits are calculated based on the three highest earning years for 
a House member, the 1989 pay increase resulted in a dramatic forty-five 
percent increase in the present value of expected pension benefits for the 
median member who retired in 1992.323  
The authors found that increases in expected pension benefits had an 
even greater impact on the decision to run or retire in 1992 than the golden 
parachute.324 The pension factor “increase[d] the probability of retirement 
in 1992 from 4.0% to 12.3%—over 2½ times the change associated with 
convertible campaign cash.”325 According to the authors, “members do 
look ahead to the implications for their postretirement income stream” in 
determining whether to retire, and thus “the implication is that we should 
see nonincremental increases in voluntary retirements in the lagged 
aftermath of nonincremental pay raises.”326 Although a variety of 
methodologies are used to measure congressional retirement behavior, 
these studies demonstrate that “unusually attractive financial incentives 
. . . significantly affected retirement decisions in 1992.”327  
Second, a comparison can be drawn between Supreme Court Justices 
and tenured faculty members at colleges and universities throughout the 
United States.328 Tenured faculty members generally are at least as highly 
educated as Supreme Court Justices. Also, like Justices, tenured faculty 
members ordinarily enjoy their positions for life;329 indeed, colleges and 
universities have been barred from enforcing a mandatory retirement age 
for professors since 1994.330 The prohibition on mandatory retirement has 
 322. Hall & Van Houweling, supra note 315, at 123. Specifically, Congress passed a major pay 
increase for House members in a 1989 ethics reform package, causing salaries to increase from 
$96,000 per year in 1990 to $129,500 by 1992. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 
§ 703, 103 Stat. 1716, 1768. 
 323. Hall & Van Houweling, supra note 315, at 124. The present value of expected pension 
benefits for the median house member increased by $185,000 between 1990 and 1992. Id. 
 324. See id. at 128.  
 325. Id. at 130.  
 326. Id. at 132–33. 
 327. Clarke et al., supra note 315, at 68. 
 328. See Charles Fairman, The Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 HARV. L. REV. 397, 432 (1938) 
(“The experience of the universities and colleges is persuasive in a discussion of compulsory 
retirement. For in this respect the case of the professor is similar to that of the judge.”). 
 329. Robert L. Clark & P. Brett Hammond, As Professors Age, Retirement Policies Need 
Rejuvenation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 2000, at B7. 
 330. See Robert L. Clark & P. Brett Hammond, Introduction: Changing Retirement Policies and 
Patterns in Higher Education, in TO RETIRE OR NOT: RETIREMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 1, 1 (Robert L. Clark & P. Brett Hammond eds., 2001) [hereinafter TO RETIRE OR NOT?] 
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caused a greater proportion of college faculty members to retire later than 
the average worker, often well into their seventies.331 Supreme Court 
Justices often do the same.332 
Perhaps the most comprehensive studies of faculty retirement behavior 
have focused on the University of California system. Due to severe 
budgetary constraints in the early 1990s, California established a series of 
three voluntary early retirement incentive programs (“VERIPs”) for 
faculty members that met certain age and service requirements.333 The 
severance incentives provided by the VERIPs altered the formula for the 
computation of pension benefits under California’s defined benefit plan by 
adding years of service and age credits.334 VERIPs amounted to a 
sophisticated buyout program of tenured faculty members.  
One study of the California VERIPs, conducted by Professor John 
Pencavel, a professor of economics at Stanford University, analyzed the 
statistics for all faculty that were eligible for the VERIPs and found that 
the increase in retirement rates attributable solely to the VERIPs was 
approximately eighteen percent for all three plans.335 These findings led to 
the conclusion that “faculty were very responsive to the separation 
incentives: holding constant a number of other factors (such as age and 
salary), someone presented with a 10 percent higher severance incentive 
had an 8 percent higher severance probability.” A second scholar 
examining the VERIPs concluded that such “incentives are positively and 
significantly associated with early retirement across the three VERIP 
samples.”336 
Although the attributes of tenured faculty members and members of 
Congress do not perfectly match those of Supreme Court Justices, these 
examples nonetheless provide strong evidence that retirement incentives 
do influence retirement behavior. For both of these comparable actors, 
(noting that mandatory retirement for tenured faculty ended when an amendment to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act became effective).  
 331. Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Did the Elimination of Mandatory Retirement Affect 
Faculty Retirement?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 957, 958, 968 (2002).  
 332. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 24. 
 333. See John Pencavel, The Response of Employees to Severance Incentives, 36 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 58, 59–61 (2001); Ellen Switkes, The University of California Voluntary Early Retirement 
Incentive Programs, in TO RETIRE OR NOT?, supra note 330, at 106, 111 fig.4.  
 334. See Pencaval, supra note 333, at 61–62.  
 335. See id. at 79–81 & tbl.9.  
 336. Seongsu Kim, The Impact of Research Productivity on Early Retirement of University 
Professors, 42 INDUS. REL. 106, 120 (2003). 
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“early retirement incentives . . . greatly increase the chances of 
retirement.”337 
3. The Golden Parachute for Supreme Court Justices 
Justices respond to financial incentives to retire, as the empirical and 
historical evidence amply demonstrates. Yet at times, mentally and 
physically incapacitated Justices still serve on the Supreme Court, even for 
extended periods of time. In this section, we introduce economic 
justifications to explain the reluctance of Justices to retire. We then outline 
our golden parachute, which provides a substantial financial incentive for 
Justices to retire in a timely manner. Finally, we respond to objections and 
show that a golden parachute could change the late retirement norm on the 
Court.  
a. The Intangible Benefits of Judging 
In addition to pensions, the intangible benefits of judging also play a 
considerable role in the calculus of when to retire. As Judge Posner has 
noted, senior judges on the lower courts essentially “work[] for nothing” 
because they receive approximately the same pension whether they work 
or not.338 Yet the vast majority of judges opt to remain on the bench, at 
least in a limited capacity, by electing senior status.339  
Moreover, federal judges actually leave money on the table by staying 
on active duty rather than electing senior status. Unlike the salaries of 
active judges, the pension income of senior judges is not subject to FICA 
taxes,340 and “many states with an income tax exempt such income.”341 
Nonetheless, many Supreme Court Justices in particular have stayed on 
the bench for years after they have become pension eligible. What explains 
this seemingly irrational behavior?  
 337. Bahman Bahrami & Jerome Stockrahm, Analysis of Faculty Retirement Intention: Using a 
Proportional Odds Model, 17 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 55, 58 (2001). 
 338. POSNER, supra note 230, at 33. To be sure, senior judges meeting the certification 
requirements remain eligible for annual salary increases, whereas retired judges do not. However, in 
light of the small raises for federal judges in recent years, presumably a retired judge could do better 
working in the private sector.  
 339. Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial 
Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495 (2005). 
 340. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3121(i)(5) (2000) (exempting compensation for senior judges from FICA 
taxes); Yoon, supra note 187 (manuscript at 44).  
 341. Darryl Van Duch, Senior Judge Ranks Close Vacancy Gap, NAT’L L.J., July 22, 1996, at A1. 
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If there is no financial incentive to remain on the bench, then the 
intangible aspects of judging must provide substantial utility to federal 
judges.342 Judge Posner identifies several potential considerations: 
reputation, prestige, popularity, and avoiding reversal.343 Calabresi and 
Lindgren further argue that the “social status associated with being a 
[Supreme Court] Justice” has drastically improved over time, encouraging 
more Justices to stay on the bench.344 Indeed, the job of being a Supreme 
Court Justice may be “the ultimate achievement” for any lawyer.”345 The 
added prestige and social status associated with being a judge, and 
particularly a Supreme Court Justice, may be the most salient intangible 
factor in the retirement decision. Some have speculated that this might 
explain William Rehnquist’s refusal to retire from the coveted position of 
Chief Justice, despite difficult treatment for what proved to be terminal 
thyroid cancer.346  
Professor Albert Yoon recently conducted a survey of every sitting 
senior judge on the federal circuit and district courts, asking them to 
elaborate on their decision to take senior status rather than fully retire.347 
More than thirty percent of senior circuit judges answered that they liked 
being a judge and wanted to continue doing it.348 Many cited the 
intellectual stimulation of the work.349 Still others stated that senior status 
maintained structure in their lives and kept their brains active.350 Perhaps 
one respondent summed up the intangible factors best: “I have a deep and 
abiding regard and love for the federal judiciary and wish to serve as long 
as possible.”351 
The intangible benefits of being a judge may help explain the 
retirement behavior of Supreme Court Justices. When a Justice decides not 
to retire, the marginal utility acquired from continuing to judge must 
 342. A federal judge that chooses active status over senior status, or senior status over full 
retirement, must gain more marginal utility from judging than from having the additional leisure time. 
 343. Posner, supra note 312, at 31. 
 344. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 34. At least one reason for the increased prestige, 
according to Calabresi and Lindgren, is that the Court has become increasingly politicized in recent 
years, garnering greater attention from the public. See id. at 34. 
 345. See id. (manuscript at 24). 
 346. See, e.g., David A. Savage, Chief Justice Isn’t Retiring, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A1. 
 347. Yoon, supra note 339, at 499.  
 348. Id. at 536. District judges also cited their enjoyment of the job as being the primary reason 
for electing senior status. Id. at 538. 
 349. Id. at 536. 
 350. Id. at 537–39. One senior district judge wrote: “I love my job. Nothing I am doing ‘on the 
outside’ can compare with the challenge, the interest, and the learning I enjoy on the bench.” Id. at 
538. 
 351. Id. at 540–41. 
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outweigh the next best alternative. As the empirical evidence has 
established, the current financial incentives to retire are effective,352 but 
perhaps not to the degree to which we would desire. Assuming that 
Supreme Court Justices are rational economic actors, greater financial 
incentives to retire ought to tip the scales toward retirement, especially if 
the accoutrements attached to the office of Senior Justice help to minimize 
any corresponding loss of prestige and social status.353  
b. Our Proposal  
There are a number of methods to augment retirement benefits, from 
lump-sum payments to changing the pension annuity. We believe that a 
fixed annuity is the best way to encourage timely retirement and to ensure 
that the incentive remains in place on an ongoing basis. With an annuity, 
the financial incentive to retire is always present, even when a Justice 
decides to retire in his nineties as Oliver Wendell Holmes did. Therefore, 
our plan has two major features: (1) it doubles the pension annuity 
available to Justices, and (2) it allows Justices who certify their disability 
to accelerate eligibility for the full pension.  
We first propose increasing the pension annuity to double the salary of 
an active Justice, an increase that provides a powerful incentive for 
retirement without promising payouts so large as to make the plan 
politically untenable. Table 1 confirms that the difference in pension 
wealth for an Associate Justice that retires at age sixty-five under our 
proposal is striking, taking into account taxes and a reasonable five 
percent discount rate.354 Table 1 uses the current life expectancies for an 
individual that has already reached sixty-five years of age.355 It also 
assumes no increase in salaries over time to ensure that our estimates are 
conservative.356 
 352. See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 353. See infra Part III.B. 
 354. For simplicity, we assume a thirty-five percent tax rate, which should be a close 
approximation taking into account the wealth of the current Justices and the exemption from federal 
FICA taxes and the income taxes of most states. See supra note 340. The discount rate is slightly 
above the current rate of the ten-year Treasury bond, but closer to the historical average rate for that 
instrument. See POSNER, supra note 230, at 32 n.59 (advocating the use of a discount rate between two 
and seven percent for finding the present value of a judge’s pension).  
 355. See Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2003, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., 
Feb. 28, 2005, at 25 tbl.6, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_15.pdf (current life 
expectancies). A person who lives to sixty-five can, on average, expect to live 18.5 more years. Id. 
 356. See Exec. Order No. 13,368, 70 Fed. Reg. 1147, 1152 sched. 7 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 5332 sched. 7) (current salaries for Supreme Court Justices). 
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TABLE 1 
PRESENT VALUE OF PENSION ANNUITY 
USING YEAR 2003 LIFE EXPECTANCIES (WITH TAXES) 
Age Regular Salary 1.5 Times Salary 2 Times Salary 
65 $1,562,810.88  $2,344,216.32 $3,125,621.77 
66 $1,510,092.07  $2,265,138.11 $3,020,184.14 
67 $1,454,677.39  $2,182,016.09 $2,909,354.79 
68 $1,396,429.00  $2,094,643.49 $2,792,857.99 
69 $1,335,201.97  $2,002,802.95 $2,670,403.93 
70 $1,270,843.99  $1,906,265.98 $2,541,687.98 
71 $1,203,194.96  $1,804,792.43 $2,406,389.91 
72 $1,132,086.58  $1,698,129.87 $2,264,173.16 
73 $1,057,341.95  $1,586,012.93 $2,114,683.90 
74 $978,775.13  $1,468,162.70 $1,957,550.27 
75 $896,190.67  $1,344,286.00 $1,792,381.34 
76 $809,383.11  $1,214,074.66 $1,618,766.22 
77 $718,136.50  $1,077,204.75 $1,436,272.99 
78 $622,223.84  $933,335.75 $1,244,447.67 
79 $521,406.52  $782,109.78 $1,042,813.04 
80 $415,433.74  $623,150.61 $830,867.47 
81 $304,041.86  $456,062.79 $608,083.72 
82 $186,953.77  $280,430.66 $373,907.54 
83 $63,878.18  $95,817.28 $127,756.37 
With taxes included in the calculation, Justices who elect retirement or 
senior status at age sixty-five will increase the present value of their 
expected pension wealth by $1,562,810.88 under our proposal. Under our 
proposal, the present value of retiring this year, as opposed to next year, 
steadily increases from around $105,000 at age sixty-five to around 
$250,000 at age eighty-two. The present value of retiring this year, as 
opposed to four years from now, increases from approximately $455,000 
at age sixty-five to more than $915,000 at age seventy-nine. 
Of course, Justices have only one purely financial incentive to retire 
today: the pension annuity, as opposed to their salary, is free of FICA 
taxes and income taxes in many states.357 Even for Justices who are 
relatively wealthy, an increase in expected pension wealth of this 
 
 
 357. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.  
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magnitude represents a significant financial incentive to retire.358 The 
principal benefit of increasing the pension annuity is that, although 
expected pension wealth is maximized on the day a Justice becomes 
pension-eligible, there is always an economic incentive to retire until the 
day a Justice dies.359  
For scholars who support term limits or a mandatory retirement age, 
the pension annuity can also be structured such that the incentive reaches 
its peak after the desired length of tenure or at the preferred age. For 
instance, Congress could approximate a mandatory retirement age by 
passing legislation that rendered a Justice’s pension annuity free from 
federal income taxes if the Justice retires or elects senior status within five 
years after first becoming pension-eligible.360 Because most Justices 
become eligible for their pension at age sixty-five, the inducement to retire 
would be strongest before the age of seventy.361 Alternatively, Congress 
could approximate fixed term limits by exempting the pension from 
federal income taxes for any Justice who retires or elects senior status 
within one year of reaching, say, fifteen years of service on the Court. 
Table 2 shows the power of such incentives by calculating the present 
value of the expected pension annuity for Associate Justices free of taxes, 
using the same assumptions as Table 1.362  
 358. Another potential advantage of the golden parachute is that it responds, albeit indirectly, to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s repeated pleas to raise judicial compensation. See 2002 YEAR-END REPORT 
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002year-end 
report.html (citing Insecure About Their Future: Why Some Judges Leave the Bench, THE THIRD 
BRANCH, (ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., WASH. D.C.), Feb. 2002); David S. Broder, Rehnquist and Breyer 
Argue for Judicial Pay Increases, WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at A15. 
 359. Couching our retirement incentive in an annuity means that the total amount of the economic 
incentive to retire for a Justice will decrease over time. Nonetheless, at any given point after a Justice 
becomes pension-eligible, the incentive to retire is always greater than the incentive to remain on the 
Court. Moreover, the year-to-year incentive—that is, the incentive to retire this year rather than next 
year—would actually increase each year after a Justice becomes pension eligible. 
 360. At first glance, this limited window for favorable tax treatment would appear to violate the 
Compensation Clause, which provides that judges’ “Compensation . . . shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. However, a Justice who fails to retire during the 
window never receives the benefit of the favorable tax treatment. “Compensation” that is never earned 
cannot be diminished. See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 575 (2001) (stating that the right to 
receive pension benefits “did not vest until retirement”). On the other hand, if Congress passed a law 
subsequently removing favorable tax status for a Justice who retired at age sixty-five, that action likely 
would be unconstitutional. See id. at 569, 572–76. 
 361. Of the nine sitting Justices, eight have become or will become pension-eligible at age sixty-
five, while only one (David Souter) became pension-eligible within months after turning sixty-five.  
 362. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 2 
PRESENT VALUE OF PENSION ANNUITY 
USING YEAR 2003 LIFE EXPECTANCIES (WITHOUT TAXES) 
Age Regular Salary 1.5 Times Salary 2 Times Salary 
65 $2,404,324.92  $3,606,487.38 $4,808,649.84 
66 $2,323,219.04  $3,484,828.56 $4,646,438.08 
67 $2,237,965.67  $3,356,948.51 $4,475,931.34 
68 $2,148,352.73  $3,222,529.10 $4,296,705.46 
69 $2,054,157.28  $3,081,235.92 $4,108,314.56 
70 $1,955,144.99  $2,932,717.48 $3,910,289.98 
71 $1,851,069.54  $2,776,604.30 $3,702,139.07 
72 $1,741,672.01  $2,612,508.01 $3,483,344.02 
73 $1,626,680.25  $2,440,020.38 $3,253,360.51 
74 $1,505,808.20  $2,258,712.30 $3,011,616.40 
75 $1,378,755.15  $2,068,132.73 $2,757,510.31 
76 $1,245,205.03  $1,867,807.55 $2,490,410.07 
77 $1,104,825.60  $1,657,238.40 $2,209,651.20 
78 $957,267.63  $1,435,901.45 $1,914,535.26 
79 $802,164.04  $1,203,246.05 $1,604,328.07 
80 $639,128.95  $958,693.43 $1,278,257.91 
81 $467,756.80  $701,635.20 $935,513.60 
82 $287,621.24  $431,431.86 $575,242.49 
83 $98,274.15  $147,411.22 $196,548.30 
Tax-free treatment of the pension annuity increases expected pension 
wealth even more. At double the current annuity, for example, expected 
pension wealth increases by nearly $1.7 million over a taxable pension, 
resulting in a total increase of over $3.2 million over the current regime. 
The present value of retiring this year, as opposed to next year, would 
steadily increase from about $160,000 at age sixty-five to about $380,000 
at age eighty-two. The present value of retiring this year, as opposed to 
four years from now, would increase from approximately $700,000 at age 
sixty-five to more than $1.4 million at age seventy-nine.363 
 
 
 363. The present value of the pension assumes, of course, an average life expectancy of 83.5 years 
for those reaching the age of sixty-five. For a Justice whose health is declining, the time horizon may 
appear shorter and thus lessen the effectiveness of the incentive to retire. Based on research showing a 
cumulative effect for health problems and retirement incentives, however, we remain confident that the 
larger pension benefit will be attractive even to Justices in the early stages of physical or mental 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/1
p1397 Stras Scott book pages.doc 5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] LIFE TENURE AND A “GOLDEN PARACHUTE” 1459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, because we view mental and physical infirmity of Justices as 
the central problem, we propose further changes to the treatment of 
disabled Justices. Under current law, a judge that qualifies for disability 
retirement receives “the salary of his office” for life if he has served ten or 
more years, but receives only “one-half the salary of the office” if he has 
served less than ten years.364 We propose that disabled Justices receive the 
same pension annuity as Senior Justices, even if they do not satisfy the age 
and service requirements of the rule of eighty or serve for ten or more 
years.365 Such a change would remove the existing financial disincentive 
to retire once a Justice has become mentally or physically infirm, which 
unfortunately has been the case for several Justices in the past.366  
c. A Few More Words for the Skeptic  
Suppose that, as an advocate of term limits or a mandatory retirement 
age, you doubt the effectiveness of a golden parachute. Perhaps you view 
the Supreme Court as a unique body whose members would be 
unresponsive to financial incentives. The job involves tremendous prestige 
and power, and no individual would give it up lightly. Indeed, many who 
accept the nomination are demonstrably less responsive to economic 
pressures because they have foregone, and continue to forego, lucrative 
work in private practice. As one reviewer of this Article asked rhetorically, 
“Would any amount of money persuade Justice Stevens to quit as long as 
he remains healthy?”367 
Even if you believe that Supreme Court Justices simply do not think 
about money, we encourage you to consider three other reasons why our 
proposal should influence the timing of retirements. First, our proposal 
infirmity. See infra notes 368–70 and accompanying text. Indeed, the net present value of the golden 
parachute will be highest for the precise group of Justices we would most like to leave the Court: those 
who have suffered serious physical or mental infirmity but expect to live for a long time. 
 364. 28 U.S.C. § 372(a) (2000). To meet the standards for retirement based upon “permanent 
disability” in § 372, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court must present the President with a 
certificate of disability signed by the Chief Justice. Id. It appears that the Chief Justice can meet the 
requirements of § 372 by submitting a certificate of disability to the President signed only by him. See 
id. 
 365. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Article, Congress may also wish to investigate whether more generous disability insurance can serve 
the same purpose, without the accompanying stigma and publicity surrounding the disability 
certification of a sitting Justice. 
 366. See, e.g., supra notes 265, 270–72 and accompanying text (explaining the cases of Justices 
Cardozo and Whittaker). 
 367. E-mail from Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 
to David Stras, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (Aug. 28, 2005, 
18:10 CST) (on file with author). 
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would supplement and interact with existing noneconomic incentives to 
retire, especially incentives related to declining health. Research on 
retirement decisions has found that, although both health concerns and 
retirement incentives significantly affect the timing of retirements, the 
influence is even greater when the two factors are combined.368 In other 
words, “those in relatively poor health . . . [are] more sensitive to their 
financial decisions.”369 Certainly health problems alone have prompted 
some Justices, most recently Justices Douglas and Marshall, to retire. But 
there may have been close calls over the years as well. For example, there 
was speculation about Justice Ginsburg’s retirement after she was 
diagnosed with colon cancer and underwent chemotherapy and radiation 
treatment.370 The point is that, as with other individuals, noneconomic 
issues like physical or mental infirmity arise in the lives of Justices, 
independently prompting them to seriously contemplate retirement. 
At precisely these moments, the golden parachute has its greatest 
potential, adding one more powerful incentive to retire sooner rather than 
later. The purpose of the golden parachute is not to prompt perfectly 
healthy Justices to give up their positions on the Court. We should not 
want to oust Justice Stevens from the Court “as long as he remains 
healthy.” Instead, as research on the private sector has demonstrated, 
financial incentives like the golden parachute will interact in a cumulative 
fashion with existing noneconomic factors, especially declining mental or 
physical health, to prompt timely retirement. 
Second, the very act of passing a proposal like ours provides a 
significant noneconomic incentive to retire. The pension reform we 
propose would send a strong signal to the Court that Congress disapproves 
of the Justices’ current retirement behavior. The political branches have, 
on occasion, applied informal pressure on the Court by entertaining 
various types of “Court-curbing” legislation.371 As many positive political 
theorists stress, “Supreme Court Justices take strategic actions to avoid 
 368. QUINN, supra note 285, at 65. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Angie Cannon, The Supremes’ Future, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 2000, at 18, 20. 
 371. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. 
POL. 369, 376 (1992) (“Attacking the Court is an old congressional practice dating back to the early 
years of the nation.”). The most infamous example is President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, but 
there have been dozens of more modest examples. See Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in 
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925, 926 (1965). We take no position on the constitutionality of 
aggressive Court-curbing activity. Nor do we propose any such activity in this article. Instead, we 
make the basic point that by enacting a golden parachute, Congress can make clear its dissatisfaction 
with current retirement practices on the Court. 
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negative responses by Congress.”372 Our proposal communicates 
Congress’s displeasure in two ways. First, it puts substantial sums of 
money at stake, strongly communicating that Justices have no excuse to 
remain on the Court while enduring mental or physical infirmity. Second, 
it signals that Congress may consider further action, including a 
constitutional amendment to abolish life tenure, if Justices continue to 
impair the functioning and credibility of the Court by staying too long. For 
Justices who are particularly resistant to financial incentives, but who care 
about the future welfare of the Court, a golden parachute creates a 
noneconomic incentive to conform to the wishes of Congress. 
Third, our proposal may be more successful in combination with other 
incentives-based reforms of the Supreme Court.373 In an upcoming paper, 
for example, one of the authors will propose that Congress expand the 
workload of the Court, both by reinstituting circuit riding and expanding 
the Court’s non-discretionary jurisdiction. We believe that pension reform, 
on its own, can change retirement behavior, but we see even greater 
potential for a golden parachute as part of a package of incentives aimed at 
influencing the retirement decision. 
d. Objections to a Golden Parachute 
The case for a golden parachute is strong. First, it will assuage the 
serious problem of mental and physical infirmity. Second, by encouraging 
shorter tenure, it will address a whole host of other concerns raised by 
critics of life tenure, including strategic retirement and a lack of 
democratic accountability for the Court. Third, it can bring about 
significant change with only modest reform. Our proposal, unlike the vast 
majority of competing plans, does not require a constitutional amendment, 
nor does it modify the institution of life tenure. 
Nonetheless, critics of our proposal may argue that, at a time when 
many Americans have become deeply suspicious of the excessive salaries 
and pension packages paid to corporate executives,374 our scheme simply 
is not politically practical. Like any retirement benefit, however, an 
increased pension is probably more palatable than raising salaries directly. 
In addition, our proposal need not go into effect all at once, although an 
 372. Steven Puro, Congress-Supreme Court Relations: Strategies of Power, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 117, 122 (2000).  
 373. See Stras, supra note 215 (manuscript at 18–20). 
 374. See, e.g., Dick Martin, Corporate Reputation: Reputational Mythraking, J. BUS. STRATEGY, 
Dec. 2004, at 39; Patrick McGeehan, Despite Uproar, Wall Street Elite Keep Enjoying Big Paydays, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 23, 2004, at 11. 
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abrupt and sizeable increase in pensions would have a greater influence on 
retirement behavior. Congress could phase in the golden parachute over 
time, so long as it applies any future increases retroactively to Justices that 
have already retired.375 Finally, Congress successfully increased its own 
salaries and pensions simultaneously through the Ethics Reform Act of 
1989, resulting in a forty-five percent increase in pensions and a forty 
percent increase in salaries by 1992.376 While this was not a particularly 
popular move,377 a sizable increase in pensions for high-ranking 
government officials is not unprecedented.378 At a minimum, critics of life 
tenure would have to concede that our proposal is far more feasible than 
passing a constitutional amendment. 
Others may argue that our proposal is also over- and under-inclusive. It 
is over-inclusive to the extent that Justices are compensated when they 
would have retired at the same time anyway,379 or at some point before the 
onset of physical or mental infirmity. It is under-inclusive to the extent 
that it does not guarantee that Justices, even those suffering from physical 
or mental infirmity, will leave the Court. Although we concede both 
critiques to some extent,380 the strength of our proposal is that it targets the 
people who are most resistant to departure: Justices who refuse to retire 
even when their health is failing. Thus a golden parachute has less serious 
over- and underinclusiveness problems than fixed term limits or a 
mandatory retirement age.381 
 375. If Congress were to pass a modest increase in pensions beginning next year, for example, and 
not make any future increases retroactive, there might be a perverse incentive for older Justices to hang 
on in anticipation of future raises.  
 376. See Hall & Van Houweling, supra note 315, at 122, 124. 
 377. See Generous George, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1990, at 64; William Raspberry, Op-Ed, 
Taking the Credit, Avoiding the Blame, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 1989, at 3b. 
 378. In addition, one of the authors will argue in a future article that Congress should increase the 
docket and workload of the Court, which, if adopted, would make the golden parachute look more like 
compensation for additional work than a windfall.  
 379. Perhaps the most compelling example is the retirement of Potter Stewart, who retired while 
in good health at sixty-six years of age. Because Justice Stewart would have retired anyway, a golden 
parachute would not have affected the timing of his retirement.  
 380. Over- and underinclusion is endemic to generally applicable rules, see generally FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003), but lawmakers should do their best 
to minimize the gap between their rules and objectives. 
 381. The solution perhaps most narrowly tailored to the problem of mental and physical infirmity 
is some form of medical review board, charged with periodically certifying that Justices remain fit for 
duty. Although such a proposal lies outside the scope of this Article, we note that it would be of 
dubious constitutional validity. See generally Kaufman, supra note 12 (raising constitutional 
objections to procedures which allow judges to remove their colleagues, even based upon manifest 
inability). We also note that, despite its obvious potential to address the serious problems of mental 
and physical infirmity, the high stakes involved in certification decisions could jeopardize judicial 
independence. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 11, at 474 (“An attempt 
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The over-inclusiveness critique applies to retirement incentives 
generally. Economic incentives have varying influence on people, and 
there will always be individuals who would have retired in a timely 
fashion absent the additional incentive. Some Justices may also respond to 
the incentive for the “wrong” reasons—that is, for reasons other than 
mental and physical infirmity. Because the retirement behavior of Justices 
has become a serious and persistent problem, however, we should be 
willing to tolerate modest expenditures to protect the legitimacy and 
credibility of the Court.  
Moreover, for two reasons, a golden parachute has fewer 
overinclusiveness problems than a mandatory retirement age or fixed term 
limits. First, to the extent that the overinclusiveness critique emphasizes 
the loss of productive years from our “great” Justices, such as Justice 
Holmes and Chief Justice Marshall, at least our proposal still vests the 
ultimate decision to retire in the Justices themselves. Plus, retirement 
incentives tend to have their greatest effect on the weakest performers. 
Empirical studies of faculty retirement behavior demonstrate that the least 
engaged and productive faculty members tend to take advantage of 
economic retirement incentives.382 Likewise, Professor Squire has found 
that “the more a [J]ustice produces the less likely he is to retire.”383 
Accordingly, the golden parachute should have a disproportionately strong 
influence on the least active Justices, which is likely our target 
population.384 Second, as noted above, financial incentives tend to interact 
in a cumulative fashion with noneconomic incentives to retire, especially 
declining health.385 Thus, a golden parachute is a solution that tracks more 
closely with the problem of mental and physical infirmity on the Court. 
The under-inclusiveness critique is that a golden parachute cannot 
guarantee that Justices will retire at any particular time, which critics of 
life tenure present as an advantage of imposing a mandatory retirement 
to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability would much oftener give scope to 
personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good.”). 
 382. See Steven G. Allen et al., Phasing Into Retirement, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 112, 124 
(2004) (“[T]he evidence is unambiguous—the odds of entering phased retirement were strongly and 
inversely related to employee performance, as measured by recent pay increases.”); Kim, supra note 
336, at 122 (finding that “professors who slowed down on research later in their careers were more 
likely to retire early” in response to the California VERIPs). 
 383. Squire, supra note 184, at 186; see also Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 185, at 156 (“[A]n 
increase in the number of opinions and dissents from its mean of eighteen to 32 (a change of one 
standard deviation) results in an 82 percent decrease in the hazard rate for retirement.”).  
 384. Zorn and Van Winkle note that “a justice’s health will be reflected in the amount of work he 
or she is able to accomplish.” Zorn & Van Winkle, supra note 185, at 156.  
 385. See supra notes 368–69 and accompanying text. 
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age. We do not deny that our proposal lacks certainty; economic incentives 
can never guarantee results because of widespread variation in human 
behavior and preferences. Our claim, however, is that even if Justices do 
not retire according to a fixed schedule they should, over time and in the 
aggregate, react to economic incentives to retire, and mentally and 
physically infirm Justices are the most likely to respond. Moreover, if the 
primary problem associated with life tenure is mental and physical 
infirmity, requiring Justices to retire at a certain age or after a certain term 
of years is actually counterproductive because those conditions do not 
follow a fixed schedule either. A golden parachute would not ensure that 
Justices retire by any particular age, but it can better address the chronic 
problems associated with mentally and physically infirm Justices. 
Finally, critics might argue that the golden parachute creates a perverse 
incentive for a President to nominate independently wealthy candidates, 
who should be the least responsive to financial incentives to retire. While 
this argument has some facial plausibility, we doubt that a President will 
strongly consider socioeconomic status in making nomination decisions. A 
nominee‘s sensitivity to wealth over a long period is difficult to predict 
even if a President has perfect information today about a nominee’s net 
worth. Far more salient issues, such as a nominee’s confirmability and 
stance on important constitutional issues, would influence a President’s 
nomination decision more than the mere possibility that economic 
incentives might induce a nominee to retire in two or three decades.  
B. Enhancing the Office of “Senior Justice” 
In the lower federal courts, the position of senior judge carries many of 
the same responsibilities as active status. For instance, senior judges are 
able to participate in the work of their courts,386 and sometimes senior 
circuit judges can even participate in en banc proceedings.387 Other 
perquisites may include keeping their chambers in the same courthouse388 
and retaining their full cadre of law clerks.389 Many times the only 
appreciable difference between senior and active status is the amount of 
work involved.390 
 386. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(b), (c) (2000); Van Duch, supra note 341. 
 387. See POSNER, supra note 230, at 136. 
 388. See Kelly J. Baker, Note, Senior Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan Strategists, or Self-
Interest Maximizers?, 16 J.L. & POL. 139, 139 (2000). 
 389. See James Gill, No More Room at the Courthouse?, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 3, 
1996, at B7. 
 390. See Yoon, supra note 339, at 519–22. Senior judges also have greater control over their 
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The office of Senior Justice, however, bears little resemblance to 
service as an active Justice. First, the offices of Senior Justices are located 
in the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building behind Union Station 
in Washington, D.C., which is several blocks from the Court building.391 
Second, Senior Justices receive only one law clerk, not the usual four 
allotted to active Justices.392 Third, some Senior Justices, such as Justice 
Brennan, have been barred from using the Court’s cars and drivers.393 
Finally, despite the lack of any obvious constitutional limitation, Senior 
Justices do not participate in any meaningful way in the Court’s 
business.394 They do not vote on certiorari petitions, sit by designation on 
the Court, or even dine with the other Justices with any regularity in the 
Justice’s Dining Room.395 The office of Senior Justice is largely limited to 
sitting by designation on the lower federal courts,396 and occasionally 
performing special projects.397 It is no wonder that Justices are so reluctant 
to retire. 
The Court should make the office of Senior Justice more appealing by 
implementing modest reforms. It would be significant, for example, if 
Senior Justices were once again allowed to fully take advantage of the 
Court’s resources, including its cars and drivers. More importantly, at the 
conclusion of the Court’s modernization project, Senior Justices should 
once again be assigned offices in the Court building. Justices obviously 
will be more reluctant to retire if they will no longer have an opportunity 
to converse with their former colleagues or take advantage of the Court’s 
resources. 
Congress can take action as well. Rather than limiting a Senior Justice 
to sitting on the lower courts and working on special projects, Congress 
can enact a statute allowing Senior Justices to take on important 
dockets. 
 391. Justice O’Connor is the first Senior Justice since Justices Brennan and Powell to retain an 
office in the Supreme Court building. Compare Tony Mauro, Space Race, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2006, at 4, with WARD, supra note 5, at 207.  
 392. Mauro, supra note 391, at 10. 
 393. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 26 (1998). 
 394. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 470. 
 395. See Richard Corelli, Souter, Brennan: Friends of the Court Two Justices Share a Bond 
Beyond Ideology, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, at A14. 
 396. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2000). 
 397. For instance, retired Justice Byron White chaired the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, which investigated whether to split the Ninth Circuit. Carl Tobias, 
Justice Byron White and the Importance of Process, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297, 300–01 (2003). 
Also, Chief Justice Burger retired, in part, to devote more time to the bicentennial celebration of the 
Constitution. See John Paul Stevens, “Random Recollections,” 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 272 
(2005).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1397 Stras Scott book pages.doc 5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1466 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1397 
 
 
 
 
 
 
administrative duties related to the work of the federal judiciary, the 
Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference of the United States, or the 
Federal Judicial Center. Developing a “menu” of suitable duties will 
require creativity, but there are many projects that Senior Justices might 
find attractive.398 For example, Senior Justices could head up committees 
that consider revisions to federal procedural, evidentiary, or bankruptcy 
rules, or play an expanded role in policy decisions that affect the Supreme 
Court.399 When needed, they could function as special masters in cases 
arising under the Court’s original jurisdiction—a role that increasingly has 
been filled by law professors in recent years.400 Congress could also 
authorize Senior Justices to perform some of the miscellaneous high-
prestige duties presently assigned, by historical coincidence, to the Chief 
Justice. For example, a Senior Justice could serve as a Regent of the 
Smithsonian Institution or a Trustee of the National Gallery of Art, both of 
which are current duties of the Chief Justice.401 
Modest institutional reforms can make the office of Senior Justice far 
more attractive. As stated above, the intangible benefits of judging play a 
large role in the retirement decision. Thus, improving the accoutrements 
attached to the office of Senior Justice should encourage more Justices to 
retire in a timely manner. 
 398. A significant change in the duties of a Supreme Court Justice upon electing senior status, 
particularly if the new office involves exclusively nonjudicial duties, may well create Appointments 
Clause and Article III problems. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. We discuss these 
constitutional objections, and potential solutions, in a forthcoming article. See Stras & Scott, supra 
note 103. 
 399. Perhaps the best way to keep Senior Justices engaged in the work of the Court would be to 
allow Senior Justices to sit by designation in cases where a Justice in regular active service is absent or 
recused. Such a system would have the added advantage of reducing the odds that an equally divided 
Court will summarily affirm lower court decisions. There would be some risk, however, that litigants 
would strategically choose named parties that would result in a recusal, hoping to replace an active 
Justice with a more favorable Senior Justice. Moreover, Congress would need to closely examine the 
constitutionality of such a proposal, for some of the reasons we have described. See supra notes 80–87 
and accompanying text (explaining that the essential powers and duties of judicial office include the 
presumptive right to cast a vote in disputes that come before the court); supra notes 106–08 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that “upward” designation to the Supreme Court may run afoul of the 
Article III requirement of “one supreme Court”).  
 400. Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Looking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the 
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 647–48 (2002). 
 401. See J. Clifford Wallace, Comparative Perspectives on the Office of Chief Justice, 38 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 219, 219–20 (2005). 
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CONCLUSION 
We join the chorus of commentators that call for changing the 
retirement behavior of Supreme Court Justices. Unlike others, however, 
we find a mandatory retirement age or term limits to be an unsatisfactory 
solution. The statutory proposals to modify life tenure are unconstitutional, 
both as a textual and an original matter. More fundamentally, even 
constitutional amendments to abolish life tenure focus on the wrong 
problems. The most serious problem associated with belated retirement on 
the Court is mental and physical infirmity of Justices, which has cultivated 
skepticism about the Court’s credibility. The purported recent increase in 
average length of tenure is largely overblown, and longer tenure helps to 
protect the legitimacy and credibility of the Court. Although we 
acknowledge the danger of strategic retirement, the evidence is largely 
speculative, and in any case other factors have a far stronger effect on 
retirement decisions. Simply put, life tenure should be retained. 
Arguing in favor of life tenure does not end the matter: the problems 
associated with mental and physical infirmity must still be addressed. Vast 
empirical and historical evidence, much of which has been ignored by the 
legal academy, demonstrates that pension reform is the single most 
important tool in affecting the retirement behavior of Justices and 
comparable actors. We thus propose that Congress implement a golden 
parachute by doubling the pension annuity of Justices upon retirement or 
certification of permanent disability. As Judge Posner has hypothesized 
and empirical scholars have verified, Justices will respond to economic 
incentives to change their behavior. In this same vein, Congress and the 
Court should also implement modest institutional reforms to make the 
office of Senior Justice more attractive to Justices. In combination, such 
reforms should assuage the problems associated with life tenure without 
eradicating it.  
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